

PCdoB: 90 years in defense of Brazil, democracy, and socialism




PCdoB **90**
years



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COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY
OF BRAZIL (PCdoB)¹ IN THE COURSE OF
THE COMMEMORATIONS OF THE 90
YEARS OF THE FOUNDATION OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY OF BRAZIL.

¹ Unless otherwise stated, all acronyms/abbreviations
used are in Portuguese.

Summary

Presentation	9
I. The party in the cycles of Brazilian history	13
Historical antecedents	15
FIRST PHASE: As the Old Republic (1922-1930) declines, the workers' boldness creates the Party	18
SECOND PHASE: The communists in the age of national-developmentalism (1930 to 1964)	23
❑ 1930 to 1935 – "Class against class". Predominance of a leftist line	24
❑ 1935 to 1945 – The fight against Fascism and the conquest of democracy	26
❑ 1945 to 1948 – Legality and expansion	30
❑ 1948 to 1956 – In search of a revolutionary line	35
❑ 1956 to 1962 – The rise of revisionism and reformism	41
❑ 1962 to 1964 – The reorganization of the Communist Party of Brazil	44
THIRD PHASE: The communists in the fight against the dictatorship and for democracy (1964-1985)	48
FOURTH PHASE: The communists in the struggle to consolidate democracy and against neoliberalism (1988-2002)	63
FIFTH PHASE: Toward the victory of the country's project of change (2002- 2012)	71
II. The legacy to the Nation and the workers	83
THE FIRST GENERATION	88
THE SECOND GENERATION	90
THE THIRD GENERATION	96
Remaking the third-generation leading collective	99
THE FOURTH GENERATION	104
III. Guidelines for the Party to move forward	115
IV. New times and new struggle for socialism	139

Foreword

Renato Rabelo

On March 25, 2012 the Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB) celebrated its 90th year of uninterrupted activities in Brazil. The PCdoB is the oldest party in operation in the Brazilian political scene and, at the same time, the youngest from the point of view of its social composition and ideas.

In order to mark this milestone and to draw lessons from this invaluable nine-decade-long history of struggles, the leading committee of the PCdoB resolved to draw up document *PCdoB: 90 years in defense of Brazil, democracy, and socialism*, which we are now publishing. To fulfill our task we based ourselves on the complete history of the communist banner in Brazil.

The PCdoB is the continuer – and contemporary expression – of the Communist Party founded in 1922. All these years the PCdoB has gone through great hardship, enduring the violence of the dominant classes, yet has never stopped reaffirming its ideological foundations. In this path and after a varied learning process it came to formulate a coherent core line, one which has strengthened the Party while keeping it abreast of the times.

The Communist Party of Brazil's most remarkable feature is its advanced political strug-

gle for change in Brazil, a historical exigency of the development of the Brazilian society, which has therefore been intertwined with the country's political history from the early twentieth century to the these early twenty-first century years. Just as it is inconceivable to think of the history of the Party without bearing in mind the development of the history of Brazil, it is just as inconceivable to think of the history of Brazil without considering the valuable contributions made by the Communist Party of Brazil.

A second idea guided us in drafting this document: Rescuing the legacy of the three generations constitutive of its persistent construction, starting in 1922. From each generation we highlighted the most prominent leaders, those who symbolized and expressed historical perspective and the boldness and daring of a host of cadres, militants, and members who have striven –many having given their own lives– in defense of the transformative and revolutionary ideas of this nearly a century-old political organization.

From the first generation stands out the figure of Astrojildo Pereira, the mastermind behind the foundation of the Communist Party of Brazil. From the second gains salience the role played by Luiz Carlos Prestes, with his track record of struggles that began even before he joined the Party, with the march he led and which came to be known as the *Coluna Prestes*,

and continued to his national and international acclaim as a communist and popular leader. From the third we underscore the decisive contribution by João Amazonas, builder and ideologue of the Communist Party of Brazil, which flourished into the twenty-first century.

The present generation of leaders has chosen to draw up this document through collective collaboration. A committee was appointed by the PCdoB national leadership and charged with writing a first draft to be used as the blueprint for the final document. On this committee served Renato Rabelo, president; Luciana Santos, vice-president; and Central Committee members Haroldo Lima, Adalberto Monteiro, and Augusto Buonicore. Each one embraced the task of drafting a part of the original text, which was later on amended and enriched by the National Political Commission. Eventually, on April 1st, 2012, the same Central Committee, in a plenary meeting held in the city of São Paulo, discussed and approved the document, not before introducing tens of amendments.

In its conclusions the document systematizes the teachings that can be learned from the long history of the Communist Party of Brazil, an indispensable organization for the new times we are living and the new struggle for socialism. This systematization builds on the Party's broad experience and struggles, setting GUIDELINES to forge this Party, armed with strategic and rev-

olutionary thought and with combative tactic, both broad and flexible. It delineates a new historical period ripe with changes and challenges which calls for contemporary responses and alternatives. It reaffirms that the Party's present Program – *Strengthening the Nation, fighting for socialism* – is a proposal for the workers and the people as a whole. A proposal for a modern alternative for Brazil, made by Brazil, for the world's current conditions.

This document of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Brazil is the basis guiding cadres and militants and their studies. In addition, it might prove to be a clarifying record for those studying the political history of Brazil and a reference for political militants of all stripes willing to embrace a New National Development Program and build a prosperous, democratic, sovereign, and just Brazil. A socialist Brazil.

São Paulo, May 2012.



The party in the cycles of Brazilian history

One cannot understand the history of the Communist Party of Brazil without understanding the history of Brazil; nor can one understand Brazilian history without taking into account the actions of the communists. Therefore, the history of the Party may be presented against the background of the dynamics of the great cycles of the Brazilian republican history in five phases, by underscoring the participation of the communists in the main events that took place throughout this period.

Historical antecedents

“It can therefore be said that to write the history of a party is to write the general history of a country from a monographic point of view (...). A party will have greater or lesser meaning and weight precisely to the extent that its particular activity has greater or lesser weight in determining the history of a country”
(Antonio Gramsci)

Put in other words, the paradigm by this outstanding Italian Marxist means that it is in the great moments of a nation and its people that an assessment of the real dimension of a party's history can take place.

The synthesis of the history of the Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB) presented next is governed by this parameter of intimate connection with the general history, yet without overlooking

its internal determinations – ideological struggles, incorporations and schisms, and ratifications and corrections of tactical and strategic courses.

The Communist Party of Brazil is the result of the growth of the young Brazilian working class and the maturing of its political consciousness. Since the terminal crisis of the slave system in the late nineteenth century, Brazil had entered a process of relative industrial development. Typically capitalist relations began to expand as the two new characteristic social classes of this system strengthened themselves: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.

Factory workers, though still not in great numbers in the two first decades of the twentieth century, were beginning to rise in the Brazilian political setting. To Nelson Werneck Sodré, a Marxist scholar who studied the history of Brazil and the communists, the Party “was born and grew as a necessary consequence of the process of formation of the Brazilian working class and the development of its struggles. Its founding responded to a demand of the labor movement, which, in the early decades of the twentieth century, had already shown the need for a workers’ revolutionary party”.

In 1906, factory workers held their first national congress, sowing the seeds for the establishment of the country’s first national trade union confederation: the Brazilian Workers’ Confederation (COB).

A few years later, in 1913, a second congress proposed a “revolutionary general strike” should an imperialist war occur – a fact that shows how these workers were in line with the more advanced yearnings of the workers of the world. At the 3rd Congress, in 1920, a special salutation to the Russian proletariat and the Communist International was approved. Workers also organized great mobilizations – albeit regional – such as the general strikes in São Paulo in 1917 and in Rio de Janeiro and Recife in 1919. Yet, the victories won those days could not endure the great clashes against the bosses and the government. Many of the victories conquered in those memorable struggles were short-lived. The workers and trade union movement went into an ebbing phase.

This happened, in great part, as a result of misguided conceptions and practices adopted by the anarchist factions, hegemonic within the more combative unionism. Strategic issues (such as broadening democratic freedoms – “clean” elections, the secret ballot, enfranchising women, the illiterate, and the immigrants– along with land reform and the defense of anti-imperialist banners) were overlooked by the anarchists’ claims. These banners could have further strengthened the labor movement and attracted important allies.

Just as the Brazilian workers’ movement was in a gridlock, the good winds of the victorious socialist revolution of 1917 in Russia (which had already been blowing around the world) arrived in Brazil.

The triumph of the Russian workers would show Brazilian workers a new path: that of the necessary organizing of the proletariat into an independent, class-driven political party, whose goals were to conquer political power and establish socialism.

From the political and ideological clashes between the vanguard sectors of the Brazilian proletariat would emerge the first communist groups, which would later on unite to found the Communist Party of Brazil (PCB).

FIRST PHASE: As the Old Republic (1922-1930) declines, the workers' boldness creates the Party

To the British Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm the eruption of the First World War (1914-18) and the Russian Revolution (1917) were the first milestones of the 20th century. Therefore, from a historical point of view, the century would have started more than a decade late with reference to the calendar. Applied to the history of Brazil, this analogy leads to the conclusion that the 20th century started even later in Brazil – in 1922, a year of crises and disruptions. Three events stood out that year: 1- the Modern Art Week in São Paulo, which asserted and renewed Brazilian culture, raising it to a new level; 2- the Tenente rebellion at the Copacabana Fort, which drove a wedge in the oligarchic Republic; and 3- the foundation of the Communist Party of Brazil.

This last event represented a leap in quality for the Brazilian labor movement. It was a watershed in the history of the national proletariat's struggle. One of the architects of this process was Astrojildo Pereira. Originally an anarchist, Astrojildo Pereira founded the Communist Group of Rio de Janeiro and the review *Communist Movement*, which became a magnet for the several regional groups that would eventually come to found the communist label.

The Founding Congress of the Communist Party of Brazil was held on March 25 – 27, 1922. The first two days' proceedings took place in the city of Rio de Janeiro. Yet because of police threats, the last day's session was transferred to Niterói, with the participation of nine delegates representing 73 communists. Until 1961 the Communist Party of Brazil used the label PCB. With the 1962 reorganization, while still retaining its original name, the party adopted the label PCdoB.

Though the Party's founding was ignored by the big media, quickly the news spread among the workers by word of mouth. This was a humble and tough beginning for a party that, in time, would become increasingly influential in setting the course of the Republic of Brazil.

Unlike what had happened in most European countries, the CP of Brazil was not born from a split within a big and influential social-democratic party, but from a schism within the anarchist movement, as the Marxist presence in Brazil was

very tenuous. Many said, not without reason, that, in Brazil, communism arrived before Marxism. The Communist Manifesto of 1848, for example, was only published in Brazil in 1924, translated by communist leader Octávio Brandão.

On the labor movement front, the communists advocated worker unity and the establishment of a single workers' national center, organized on the basis of industrywide trade unions as opposed to the small guilds.

The communists strengthened the workers' movement agenda by introducing the struggle for the regulation of social and labor rights – new ideas encompassed by the more advanced workers' strata. After clashing with the anarchists and “yellow unionism” (as was known that supportive of class reconciliation) and faced by the difficult task of achieving unity while affirming Marxism, the communists were at the forefront of the creation, in 1929, of the General Confederation of Workers of Brazil (CGTB).

Earlier, in 1923, through an alliance with “yellow” trade union confederation Confederação Sindicalista Cooperativista Brasileira, the Party got a column in a big newspaper: *O Paíz*. In it, the party started to spread its propaganda and ideas more broadly. A further step was taken in 1925 with the establishment of its first official newspaper: *A Classe Operária* [The Working Class].

In 1927, *A Nação* became the first communist daily, though just for a few months. When it was

launched, *A Nação* displayed the sickle and the hammer on its nameplate next to the slogan “Proletarians of all countries, unite!”. This greatly stirred the conservative sectors. The communist press was harshly persecuted. Its printing presses were often destroyed but, somehow, the paper never stopped circulating.

Influenced by the Party, the workers broke away from the sectarianism of anarcho-syndicalism and started to engage in the broader institutional political struggle. In 1927, they created the first leftist electoral front, the *Bloco Operário* [Workers’ Bloc], which, in an Open Letter, stated, “We must cleanse politics and for that we must intervene in it and not move away from it”. Later on, the Bloc added the term “*Camponês*” [Peasant] to its name with the aim of attracting rural workers to its rank-and-file, thus adopting the acronym BOC.

Under the BOC label and with a broad platform, the Party elected its first parliamentarians: factory worker Minervino de Oliveira and pharmacist Octávio Brandão. Both became members of the Rio de Janeiro City Council in 1928.

A year earlier, Astrojildo Pereira traveled to Bolivia, where Luiz Carlos Prestes had sought exile after the end of the *Coluna Invicta*, thus known for the undefeated column led by Prestes and Miguel Costa from July 1924 to March 1927, which marched over 25,000 kilometers of the Brazilian territory while battling against the governments

of then President Arthur Bernardes and of his successor, Washington Luís. Astrojildo gave Prestes some Marxist books and sounded him on the possibility of an alliance between the communists and the tenentes.

In 1929, the BOC invited Prestes to run in the following year's presidential elections. Faced with a refusal from the leader of the tenente movement and based on an assessment of oligarchic and inter-imperialist contradictions underpinning the other presidential candidacies (Júlio Prestes, for the incumbent party, and oppositionist Getúlio Vargas), the Party launched its own candidate. Thus, the BOC candidate was Minervino de Oliveira, who, in addition to being a councilman in Rio, was a founding member and general secretary of the CGTB. The communist candidate ran in an electoral process marked by great violence, was arrested several times, and ended up with a marginal number of votes. The historical fact that remains is that Minervino de Oliveira was the first worker, and black man, to ever run for the presidency of the Republic of Brazil.

Thanks to the perspicaciousness of this first generation of communist leaders, by the late 1920s the Communist Party of Brazil had already become a national political force, with more than one thousand militants, a parliamentary representation, and was leading hundreds of organizations plus one trade union national center. All this had been accomplished under fierce

repression by the oligarchic governments of the Old Republic, during which the Party was only legal for a non-continuous period of seven months and twelve days.

SECOND PHASE: the communists in the age of national-developmentalism (1930-1964)

The Revolution of 1930 ushered in a new phase in the life of the country, one marked by sharp economic development and superstructural transformations, with the State as the main driver of development, by way of a contradictory process often tainted by authoritarianism and exclusion of the popular masses from the political decision-making process. This happened mostly during the New State and the administration of Marshall Eurico Gaspar Dutra. Though transition from the agrarian-exporting to the urban-industrial economy was fast, latifundia and foreign dependence had not been outweighed.

Without fully grasping the scope of this revolutionary process and its ensuing development, the role of the various fractions of the Brazilian bourgeoisie, and still conditioned by the determinations of the Communist International (CI) and the Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties (Cominform), the Communist Party of Brazil had an unstable political action, at times falling into reformism, at others into left

-wing communism. Still, the Party made significant contributions to the struggle against Fascism and against the looming imperialist war, and toward the accomplishment and broadening of democracy and national sovereignty. It was also decisive in starting a national-people's tradition in Brazilian culture.

Given this phase's complexity, differently from the first phase this one has been subdivided into several phases.

□1930 to 1935 – “Class against class”. Predominance of a leftist line

The 6th Congress of the Communist International, held in 1928, adopted a political line of a leftist character that would be designated as “class against class”. Among other misconceptions, the 6th Congress equated social-democracy with Fascism, claiming the former to be one of the worst enemies of the working class.

Because of this guideline, the Party's political line in favor of an alliance with the revolutionary tenentes movement was harshly criticized by the Communist International as rightist. As a result the Party made no more attempts toward an alliance with the tenentes, who were represented by Prestes, dissolved the BOC and started to consider that “all bourgeois or petit bourgeois groups are, one way or another, linked to imperialism”. In the absence of a typical social democracy, the

Party viewed the “Coluna Prestes as a pronounced enemy of the revolutionary movement”. Influenced by this misguided tactic, the Party did not participate in the 1930 Revolution – interpreted merely as a clash between rival regional oligarchies backed by the U.S. and British imperialisms.

Such directives and assessments led the Party to isolation and prevented the working class from playing a prominent role in the historic event of October 1930.

With left-wing communism emerged obreirismo (‘workerism’), a distorted approach to the correct appreciation of the workers’ position in the party structure. From the prism of obreirismo, the social origin of the leaders increasingly prevailed over political and ideological criteria. This deviance would lead to the ousting of old party leaders of the likes of Astrojildo Pereira, Octávio Brandão, Leôncio Basbaum, and Paulo Lacerda. The party leading collective was deeply destabilized, undergoing a number of changes until 1934, especially in the General Secretariat.

Nonetheless, the end of this period marked the beginning of the fight against Fascism and the war that was looming in the horizon with an attempt to make up a united anti-Fascist front, bringing together communists, Trotskyists, socialists, anarchists and leftist tenentes. At that time, Prestes had already joined the Party.

Violent clashes occurred between this front and the Brazilian fascist integralistas, epitomized

by the so-called Sé Square Battle in São Paulo on October 7, 1934.

Although banished, the Party takes part in the 1934 Constituent Assembly represented by federal deputy Álvaro Ventura, a stevedore leader elected by his comrades and the first communist to become a member of the Brazilian Congress.

□1935 to 1945 –The fight against Fascism and the conquest of democracy

Once the damages caused by the previous orientation had been understood, the 7th Congress of the Communist International (held in Moscow between July and August 1935 and chaired by the prominent Bulgarian communist Georgi Dimitrov) approved the centrality of the fight against Nazi-Fascism and the establishment of the Popular Fronts.

Shortly before the 7th Congress, the party broke away from left-wing communism and moved toward the construction of broad alliances with the other progressive forces with the aim of combating the rise of Fascism in the world and in Brazil, where it was represented by the Ação Integralista Brasileira (AIB), headed by Plínio Salgado. The turning point in this process was the creation of the National Alliance for Freedom (ANL) in January 1935. The first ANL documents proclaimed, “To the ANL shall come all the people, organizations and even parties (...) under the sole

condition that they are willing to fight against the establishment of Fascism in Brazil, against imperialism and feudalism, and for democratic rights”.

“Bread, land, and freedom!” was ANL’s slogan. Its program called for cancelling foreign debts with imperialist countries and the handing over of the latifundia to the peasants, among other democratic and social demands. The ANL rank-and-file rapidly grew to 200,000 members, frightening the government and the more conservative sectors.

In light of the period’s promising facts, the Party overestimated its strength and began to believe the ANL was ready to seize power by revolutionary means. Rallying cries “All the power to the ANL!” and “For a Revolutionary National People’s Government with Prestes at its Head” arose. But the majority of the ANL members, including many of its noncommunist leaders, were not willing to take that path yet.

Realizing the misstep, in July 1935 Vargas enforced the recently passed National Security Law, outlawed the ANL and closed its clubs and districts. The communists responded by making preparations for an armed insurrection starting in the barracks over which they had influence because of Prestes’s leadership. However, before the word of command, rebellions broke out in the Natal, Recife and Rio de Janeiro garrisons. A majority of the communist militants were taken by surprise with the uprisings and were unable to join them.

But both in Natal and Recife, the insurrectionists were supported by the people, especially by those sectors linked to the ANL. In Natal, the rebels came to seize power and, for a few days, instated a “provisional revolutionary government”.

In the 1972 document *Fifty Years of Fight* the Party judged that, “In reality, the political tactic adopted by the ANL, particularly after its banning, and its military conception were impregnated with petit bourgeois ‘revolutionarism’, which precipitated the armed struggle. Still, the 1935 insurrection is a milestone in the Brazilian people’s struggle for emancipation. For the first time ever in the country an attempt was made to put the people in power through armed struggle”.

Yet, in face of the then unfavorable circumstances, the rebellion was quickly crushed. In just a few months, from November 1935 to early 1936, the Vargas administration police force had arrested more than 15,000 people, mostly communists and ANL members. Among a number of other prisons across the country, many of those arrested were sent to insular prisons on Ilha Grande and the Fernando de Noronha Archipelago, and others to the Rio de Janeiro Correctional Facility. Party member and writer Graciliano Ramos documented the arbitrariness in his book *Memórias do Cárcere* (Prison Memoirs). Many of the detainees were brutally tortured, as was the case with internationalist leader Harry Berger. Pregnant, Prestes’ spouse, Olga Benário, was handed over to

Nazi Germany, together with Elise Berger, where both of them were killed in gas chambers.

Despite being relentlessly hunted down, in 1937 the Brazilian communists staged one of the most symbolic passages of internationalism with the sending of militants to fight side by side with the internationalist brigades in defense of the Spanish Republic, threatened by the fascist hordes of General Franco, backed by Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy. Among other important Party members who engaged in the internationalist effort were Apolônio de Carvalho, Dinarco Reis, David Capistrano da Costa, and Roberto Morena.

In 1938, the Party joined the campaign in favor of the industrialization of the country and for creating a national steel industry. Victorious, the movement contributed toward the creation in 1941 of the country's first steelworks – Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional (CSN).

Nonetheless, during the first years of the New State the leaders of the Communist Party of Brazil had been virtually decimated. In 1941, with the tenacity of the phoenix, strenuous work would begin to reorganize the Party. In his trilogy *Subterrâneos da Liberdade* (The Undergrounds of Freedom), writer Jorge Amado narrates the abnegation of the militancy to keep the party engaged in action in spite of the New State's bloodthirsty claws. The situation improved when the communists, together with democratic streams, stood out in the successful campaign calling

for Brazil to declare war against the Nazi-Fascist Axis and to deploy an expeditionary force to fight in Europe.

As World War II evolved the communists endeavored to set up a Provisional National Organizing Commission (the CNOP), the most consistent initiative aimed at remaking the Party's national committee. This endeavor won the favors of Prestes, imprisoned since 1936. This reconstruction culminated in the holding of the Mantiqueira Conference in Rio de Janeiro, in August 1943, organized by Maurício Grabois, Amarílio Vasconcelos, Diógenes Arruda Câmara, João Amazonas, Pedro Pomar, Mário Alves, and Júlio Sérgio de Oliveira. In this conference a new Central Committee was elected, with Prestes, still in jail, chosen as general secretary. The core of the tactic approved then was to defend the National Union supporting the Vargas administration against the main enemy represented by the Axis powers and their allies within Brazil: the fifth columnists.

❑ 1945 to 1948 – Legality and expansion

In April 1945 amnesty was granted to those convicted of political “crimes”. The Communist Party finally emerged from hiding and immediately started organizing huge rallies all over Brazil. Two core goals were set: the struggle for the country's actual democratization and a call for a National Constituent Assembly.

On October 29, opposition sectors linked to the dominant classes carried out a coup d'état and overthrew Getúlio Vargas. Among the motivations for the coup was the fear of a potential alliance between the getulistas and the communists. Yet, the democratic wave would prove unstoppable and the Party, whose prestige was on the rise as a result of its role in the fight against Nazi-Fascism and the New State, was granted legal status.

The Party's political influence grew rapidly and membership reached 200,000 militants in less than a year. Some of the Party's clubs came to have more than 1,000 members. In December 1945, communist presidential candidate Yedo Fiúza grabbed 10% of the votes. Prestes was elected Senator for the Federal District, while the Communist Party of Brazil made 14 national representatives: Maurício Grabois, João Amazonas, Carlos Marighella, Gregório Bezerra, José Maria Crispim, Claudino José da Silva, Joaquim Batista Neto, Osvaldo Pacheco, Abílio Fernandes, Alcides Sabença, Agostinho Dias de Oliveira, Milton Caires de Brito, Alcedo Coutinho, and Jorge Amado. The communist delegation in Congress also had the temporary participation of alternate Trifino Correia from Rio Grande do Sul, who replaced Abílio Fernandes for a few months while the latter was on leave. Next, in January 1947, 46 communist state representatives were elected in 15 states. In the same year's supplemental elections to the federal lower house Chamber of Deputies, two other

representatives were elected – Pedro Pomar and Diógenes Arruda Câmara.

In the 1946 Constituent Assembly, the Party played a remarkable and influential role. In addition to its ideology and political option, what distinguished the communist delegation from all the others was its social composition: Half of its members were manual workers, while the other half was composed of liberals or public employees (two journalists, a writer, an accountant, two military, and two doctors). All of them were first-time public officeholders, all had had intense underground activism during the New State dictatorship and twelve of them had been political prisoners before the April 1945 amnesty. Also, the communist delegation had the only black parliamentarian of that Constituent Assembly – Claudino José da Silva.

In another sphere, the communists were at the forefront of the organization of the trade union movement. Communist militants created nationwide entities such as the Workers' Unifying Movement (MUT) in 1945 and the Confederation of Workers of Brazil (CTB) in 1946. The Party also headed campaigns that led to social wins. Despite its outstanding importance, this process was short-lived due to the Dutra government repression.

Propaganda and press

Upon recovering legal status in 1945, the Party structured an influential propaganda and press

network comprising eight dailies in the most important states: *Tribuna Popular*, in the Federal District; *Hoje*, in São Paulo; *O momento*, in Bahia; *Folha do Povo*, in Pernambuco; *O Democrata*, in Ceará; *Tribuna Gaúcha*, in Rio Grande do Sul; *O Estado*, in Goiás, and *Folha Capixaba*, in Espírito Santo. The party created its own news agency, *Interpress*. The network's most important vehicle was the *Tribuna Popular*, with a daily circulation of 30,000 papers, which in its heyday in 1946 reached 50,000 papers sold daily, rivaling with the big media of the time. *A Classe Operária* also made a comeback, while, in 1947, started circulating periodical *Problemas*, the Party's main theoretical publication in those years.

This was also the golden age of the rapprochement process with the progressive intelligentsia, which had begun in the mid-1930s. Renowned artists and intellectuals lent their contribution to the party's press, including cultural publications.

In this regard, São Paulo state communists released in July 1948 magazine *Fundamentos*. At the same time were circulating smaller or more focused vehicles such as *Momento Feminino*, *Terra Livre*, *Emancipação*, *Divulgação Marxista*, *Revista do Povo*, *Horizonte*, *Paratodos*, *Literatura* – the last one run by seasoned party leader Astrojildo Pereira and an editorial board staffed with names of the likes of Álvaro Moreyra, Aníbal Machado, Arthur Ramos, Graciliano Ramos, Orígenes Lessa, and Manuel Bandeira.

Communism inspired other cultural magazines such as *Artes Plásticas*, from São Paulo; *Temário*, from Rio de Janeiro; *Seara e Presença*, from Recife; and *Seiva*, from Bahia.

In general, these publications resisted until the mid-1950s, when the communist movement faced yet another crisis.

To halt its advance, the reaction declared the Party illegal

In the process of expanding its influence there was, however, a host of misunderstandings and delusions about the international situation brought about by the Second World War. Pervading the Central Committee was the conviction that a new era of peaceful development for all the peoples of the world had begun. The leadership also nurtured the idea that foreign capital would get rid of its most reactionary characteristic while transforming itself for the benefit of progress and prosperity for all peoples. Stemming from this analysis, the Party adopted a policy of class reconciliation and social struggle containment for fear of hindering the democratic opening.

Such concessions were worthless, as the high bourgeoisie would not yield. Fearing the rapid growth of the Communist Party, the Dutra administration launched an onslaught against the party and the organizations it controlled. In May 1947, the Higher Electoral Court handed down a

ruling cancelling the registration of the Communist Party of Brazil while the Minister of Justice ordered it to cease its activities all over Brazilian territory.

Immediately, the Party's offices and presses were broken into, destroyed and closed down by the Police. On January 10, 1948 the Chamber of Deputies passed a bill decreeing the impeachment of all communist legislators. These two facts constitute the most serious legal/institutional aggression ever carried out by the Brazilian State, arbitrarily, against a single party (a legitimate party and legitimate mandates emanating from the people's will), thus bringing to an end a phase of great expansion of the Communist Party of Brazil. Indeed, this would become a recurrent expedient for the dominant classes throughout history to the present days: every time that, with the support of the people, the Party started to flourish, reactionary sectors would plot coups and devise stratagems to undermine its strengthening.

□ 1948 to 1956 – In search of a revolutionary line

In 1948 a document was released that would come to be known as the January Manifesto. In it the actions carried out by the Party during its brief period in legality are strongly criticized on the ground of reformism. In face of the conservative offensive, the Party had remained “callou-

sly within the boundaries of a strictly legal framework and of petty maneuvers”. Still according to the Manifesto, this policy had also been characterized “by systematic containment of the struggles of the proletarian masses in the name of worker-boss collaboration and by an alliance with the progressive bourgeoisie”.

Two years on – in August 1950 – another manifesto was published that represented a radical shift in the Party’s line. It proposed then the immediate formation of a “National Liberation Democratic Front”, whose goal was to overthrow the regime. The document stated that the democratic and popular phase would pave the way for the socialist revolution, while also contending that the bourgeoisie, all of it, belonged to the counterrevolutionary camp. The manifesto read, “We shall not fear higher and more vigorous forms of struggle, including violent clashes with the forces of the reaction (...) this shall lead us to the victorious struggle for power and national liberation from the imperialist yoke”.

The majority of the then existing political organizations, including labor and the socialists, were seen as belonging to the United States imperialist camp. Hence, the likelihood of any alliance was minimal. There was a breaking away from sectors of the intelligentsia that had come closer to the Party during its period in legality.

This conception prompted the Party to advocate blank voting in the 1950 presidential elections won by Vargas with 48.7% of the ballots. The

communists failed to understand the differences between the political project represented by the antiworker and sellout Dutra government and the future “labor” and nationalist government of Vargas. To the Party, both were “national treason governments, servile instruments in the hands of U.S. imperialism”.

A distinctive feature of the Dutra administration was its violent repression of communism. Tens of militants lost their lives in those years. Communist groups were massacred in the city of Tupã, SP, in 1949, and in the Rio Grande do Sul cities of Santana do Livramento and Rio Grande, in 1950. Rallies and strikes were systematically cracked down.

In spite of these hardships, the Communist Party of Brazil, the country’s then leading leftist organization, participated actively in successive campaigns for world peace. It started a petition in favor of the Stockholm Appeal against atomic weapons, which collected more than four million signatures. It also spearheaded the struggle against a Brazil-United States military agreement which provided for the sending of Brazilian troops to engage in Korea, a campaign in which the name of Elisa Branco will always be remembered after she was sentenced to several years in prison for having unfurled a banner against the war during a military parade. Moreover, the Party had a prominent role in those days’ patriotic struggles, especially in the “The Oil is Ours!” campaign.

The oil campaign was further boosted after the January Manifesto of 1948, as it stated that “defending natural riches, particularly oil”, should be part of a broad opposition front program. Army officers, personalities from the intellectual world, industrialists, religious leaders and labor leaders came together in support of this campaign.

The October 1948 National Convention in Defense of Oil, with the participation of 224 delegates from 19 states, served as a catalyst in spreading a movement that was organized in every state capital and in the main cities. More than one hundred city councils and five state legislatures lent their support. In 1953, the Chamber of Deputies passed a bill establishing the state’s monopoly over oil. That same year, the victorious “The Oil is Ours!” campaign culminates in the creation of Petrobras.

All the while, the Party strengthened its ties with the working class, especially with its most advanced sector. Its militants, who had been banned from trade union leading positions by the reaction, had turned to setting up works councils.

From 1950 to 1953 there were massive strikes which led to the creation of the Inter-Trade Union Unity Pact (PUI). Among other memorable working-class struggles headed by the Party, it is worth highlighting the 1953 strike in São Paulo, which resonated across the country. In the mid-1950s, in the villages of Trombas and Formoso, in northern Goiás State, and also in other regions of the country, like Porecatu, PR, the Party spur-

red and led a peasant uprising for land ownership. In 1954, the Party supported the founding of the Union of Farm Workers of Brazil (Ultab), a precursor to the National Confederation of Workers in Agriculture (Contag), which was founded in 1963.

Under the impact of massive workers' demonstrations, Vargas was forced to raise the minimum wage by 100%, signaling a reorientation of its economic and social policy. Yet, the Party failed to perceive this shift and continued to systematically oppose the government.

Women's struggle and their role in the party gained momentum. The communist women helped in creating the Brazilian Federation of Women and launched periodical *Momento Feminino* in 1949. Among this movement's outstanding women were Ana Montenegro, Alice Tibiriçá, Arcelina Mochel, Iracema Ribeiro, Zuleika Alambert, and Elisa Branco. Leaders like Maria Salas and Adoración Vilar were at the head of countless workers' strikes. Some of them would be elected to the Central Committee at the 4th Congress in 1954, then the largest women's representation in a governance body ever.

On August 24, 1954, as a coup to overthrow him was under way, President Getúlio Vargas committed suicide. His tragic gesture and the anti-imperialist tone of his testament letter gave rise to a popular rebellion. Due to its fierce opposition of the Vargas government, in some places the Party itself became the target of the people's wrath.

Self-critically the communists would soon come closer to the getulistas and propose an alliance policy with labor's PTB and socialist PSB, additionally to sectors from other parties outside the democratic/people's camp.

In late 1954 the 4th Congress of the Communist Party of Brazil ratified its first Program. This fact represented a step forward in furthering its tactical and programmatic formulations. At the Congress the leftist and right-wing deviations that had characterized communist politics since 1930 were fiercely criticized.

According to the Program, "Because [this] is a semicolonial and semifeudal country, the present relations of production in Brazil are violently opposed to the development of the productive forces". Hence, "concerning relations with the national bourgeoisie, the Program not only does not threaten its interests but also supports its claims of a progressive character, in particular the development of the national industry (...). The already ripe Brazilian society development needs, requiring an immediate solution, are those of an exclusively anti-imperialist and antifeudal character. The national bourgeoisie is not, therefore, an enemy; for a given period it can support the revolutionary movement against imperialism and against latifundium and feudal remains". A rather different vision from that advocated in the 1950 August Manifesto. Yet, this programmatic text was to be short-lived.

□1956 to 1962 – The rise of revisionism and reformism

In 1956 was held the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), in which Nikita Khrushchev denounced in the Secret Speech Stalin's "cult of personality" and mistakes. The speech spread a negative and unilateral vision of the complex process of construction of socialism in the USSR. Mistakes were overly highlighted while that period's great achievements were downplayed. This represented a serious blow to the international communist movement, undermined its image and authority, and ushered in a new phase in the history of the Soviet Communist Party, revisionist in character and marking the beginning of the return to capitalism.

A peaceful path was claimed as the only possible road to socialism, one assuming the possibility of peaceful coexistence and competition with imperialism for a long historical period. Such guidelines were laid out precisely when the contradictions between capitalism and socialism, between imperialism and the liberating aspirations of the peoples were escalating – contradictions that would later erupt in the Cuban Revolution and in the liberation wars in Asia and Africa.

This change of course in the CPSU was happening while in Brazil important changes were taking place. The country was at the height of the JK era, who had adopted the slogan "fifty years in

five". The economy was developing rapidly (though still relying on foreign capital and coexisting with latifundia) and democracy was broadening. Although the Party supported Juscelino Kubitschek in 1955, later on it would come to criticize some sellout aspects of his administration's economic policy.

Even though the Party was still outlawed, the arrest warrants that had been issued against the Party's leading communists during the Dutra government were suspended, and these leaders were able to come out of hiding. The prevailing concept then, even in the left, was national-developmentalism – in its reformist strand. While denying the need for ruptures, the Party reformists also conceived of a peaceful road to socialism as the absolute guideline and of the national bourgeoisie as a consequential and leading force in the revolutionary process.

It was in this atmosphere filled with delusions that the revisionist theories of the 20th Congress of the CPSU landed in the country and were endorsed by Luiz Carlos Prestes and others. Since then fierce fight broke out between these two conceptions inside the international communist movement and the Communist Party of Brazil.

Because of their positions against the revisionist and reformist theses, João Amazonas and Maurício Grabois were removed from the Central Committee. Diógenes Arruda was also removed, charged with authoritarian methods. The 1958

March Declaration consolidated the reformist turnaround of the majority of the Party leadership by stating that the democratization process was “a permanent trend” which would be able to “overcome any setbacks and unstoppably move forward”. The Declaration considered the bourgeoisie “a revolutionary force” and believed in the “real possibility of conducting, by peaceful ways and means, the anti-imperialist and antifeudal revolution” in Brazil.

Thus began to be more clearly defined two opposing groups inside the Party: one reformist, the other revolutionary. The two would engage in violent clashes at the Party’s 5th Congress, held in 1960. In this conclave, the revisionist-reformist current succeeded in obtaining a majority to approve its political line and remove from the Central Committee, among others, João Amazonas, Maurício Grabois, and Diógenes Arruda.

A year on, in August 1961, in review *Novos Rumos*, the Party’s new Program and Statute were published and filed with the Higher Electoral Court. One of the changes introduced referred to the name of the Party, which thereafter would be called the Brazilian Communist Party. From the Statute was removed any reference to proletarian internationalism and Marxism-Leninism. Thus, concretely, a new party was founded.

Disagreeing radically with these modifications, the revolutionary stream sent a letter signed by one hundred communists to the Central Commit-

tee demanding that these measures be nullified or a new congress be called to discuss the changes. In response, the board banned from the Party, among others, Amazonas, Pomar, Grabois, Ângelo Arroyo, Carlos Danielli, and Calil Chade. In light of these facts, the members of the revolutionary stream decided to take the momentous step of reorganizing the historic Communist Party of Brazil.

□1962 to 1964 – The reorganization of the Communist Party of Brazil

On February 18, 1962 was held the extraordinary Conference that reorganized the Communist Party of Brazil. The event, however modest in appearance, was one of greatest historical importance for the Brazilian people and workers. It was the moment for reorganizing the Party, just as it was being threatened in its existence as a proletarian and revolutionary organization. In such circumstances just a few were fully conscious of the historical importance of the event.

The breaking away from the CPSU, the world's most important communist party, and from the reformist majority that controlled the Brazilian party accurately portrays the boldness of these revolutionaries and their faithfulness to their principles.

There were many who stated that the smaller organization would be short-lived. The context,

widely favorable to the proliferation of reformist delusions, seemed to confirm their opinion. Yet history, always implacable, would build another road leading far beyond conventional wisdom and appearances.

The delegates attending that historic Extraordinary Conference reorganized the Communist Party of Brazil yet kept its original name, tradition and revolutionary nature, and adopted the acronym PCdoB. They also approved a Program Manifesto, according to which, “The Communist Party of Brazil (...) considers that, in the present situation, the main task of the Brazilian people is the struggle for a revolutionary government, an irreconcilable enemy of imperialism and latifundium, [and] a promoter of liberties, culture, and well-being for the masses”.

And it continued, “There was, indeed, over the past decades, relative economic development in the country. The production of means of production has increased (...). The consumer goods manufactured in the country are enough to supply the whole domestic market. Yet, this economic development, achieved through (...) a greater penetration of imperialist capital in key industrial sectors and through maintaining the present agrarian structure, has further deepened the gaps across different regions and has worsened the country’s economic, political, and social situation. Imperialism, latifundia, and monopolistic bourgeois groups are, therefore, the main obstacles

to national progress and the achievement of the people's well-being".

The political front and the government charged with this task should, according to the manifesto, represent the yearnings of "workers and peasants, intellectuals, the urban petite bourgeoisie, small and medium-sized industrialists and shop owners". The formulations in this Program were more advanced, and corresponded more accurately to the Brazilian reality, than those of the 1954 Program.

The reorganized Party was very small, as was its influence among the workers and youth. The first years of the reorganizing of the Communist Party of Brazil were marked by a fierce struggle against the delusions in the Brazilian left. In this just fight, left-wing mistakes were committed, like electing Jango and his reforms as the main target of the party's criticisms. The Party even came to campaign for abstention in the referendum aimed at restoring the powers that had been usurped from the president of Brazil in the political crisis of 1961. Life would take care of disproving these mistaken positions. Thus, the same mistake made during the second Vargas administration was repeated.

Contrary to what many have stated, the split between the Brazilian communists in 1961-62 was not a direct reflection of the Sino-Soviet schism. At the time there was little knowledge of the magnitude of the differences between the two great so-

cialist powers. Hence, until mid-1963 the reorganized PCdoB continued to see the USSR as a socialist country “that moved toward communism”.

In the first years of the reorganization, the main international point of reference was Cuba, recently freed from a dictatorship and the yoke of U.S. imperialism. The 2nd Declaration of Havana had great impact on the leadership of the Communist Party of Brazil. In April 1962, Amazonas and Grabois were invited by the Cuban government to participate in the May Day commemorations. On the revolutionary island, PCdoB leaders met with Fidel Castro.

While in Cuba they made the first contacts with the Communist Party of China, the Workers’ Party of Korea, and the Party of Labour of Albania (PLA), which were already at odds with the Khrushchev-led CPSU.

In March 1963, Amazonas and Lincoln Oest visited China and met with Mao Zedong himself. Two months later, a second delegation, composed of Pedro Pomar and Consueto Calado, visited Albania and talked with Enver Hoxha and the PLA leadership. Through these trips the PCdoB leadership realized the dimension of the crisis that had befallen the unity of the international communist movement.

The break with the CPSU would only occur in July 1963, when, in response to an accusation by that party’s general secretary, who claimed that Amazonas and Grabois, with the support

of the Chinese, had formed an antiparty splinter group, the PCdoB leadership published the Reply to Khrushchev. Marking the breakup with the USSR, this document made an impact and was hailed by the Chinese and the Albanians. Thus was the beginning of a new phase in the international relations of the Communist Party of Brazil.

THIRD STAGE: The communists in the fight against the dictatorship and for the conquest of democracy (1964-1985)

The military coup of 1964 brought an end to the democratic regime and halted progressive reforms designed to instill new dynamism in the national development. The economic growth of the dictatorship compounded foreign dependence while preserving latifundium. It was achieved at the expense of political freedoms and the social degradation of the masses. In the streets and, at times, wielding guns, the Party played a prominent role in the fight against the dictatorship, for democracy, and for a sovereign development program including more rights for the people.

Many believed that the coup would be short-lived. Yet The 1964 coup and its teachings, a document published by the Party in August 1964, warned that, "The group of military who staged the coup revealed no intention of handing the government over neither now nor later, in 1967".

The text harshly criticized the revisionist policy of the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), the largest leftist party then. According to the PCdoB, the theses on “revolution by reform” and on the revolutionary character of the bourgeoisie had “failed utterly”.

At the same time, the Party made a self-criticism of the left-wing tactical positions defended during the Jango government. It recognized that “sectarian tendencies” had manifested that prevented closer relations “with the democratic political forces” and that “some exaggerations in combating the wrongs in the politics of Mr. João Goulart” had been committed. According to the document, these positions “had put up obstacles against broader participation of the Party in the democratic and anti-imperialist movement and did not allow it to exert a more positive influence on that movement”.

The toppling of the Jango government revealed the inconsistency of the PCB’s misguided strategy, with negative impacts for the party, leading to crisis and disintegration. Leaders like Mário Alves and Carlos Marighella broke up with the PCB and created revolutionary organizations to fight the dictatorship.

More than a hundred militants made the decision to join the PCdoB. This happened in Ceará, Maranhão, Minas Gerais, and in other states. Highlights worth mentioning were the incorporations of the important Maritime Workers’ Regio-

nal Committee (CRM) in 1965 and of the Revolutionary Majority of the Regional Committee of the Guanabara PCB in 1968.

Soon the PCdoB was steadily expanding, with militants organized in nearly every Brazilian state. Throughout the years the party increased its influence among the masses and its clout in national and international politics. History has demonstrated that the existence of a communist party is a necessity of the complex process of emancipation of Brazil and the working masses.

In 1966, the 6th National Conference approved the document Union of the Brazilians to rid the country from the crisis, dictatorship, and the neocolonialist threat. In it the Party argued for the overthrow of the dictatorship and the constitution of a government representing all the democratic and patriotic forces, which would be tasked with calling a Constituent Assembly. In addition to broad unity of the oppositionist forces, it called for the need to pay greater attention to the work in the countryside, with the aim of preparing the conditions to start the armed struggle. After the conference, party cadres crossed the country in search of more adequate areas where to begin rural guerrilla, influenced by the Chinese Revolution and the concept of prolonged people's war. At the time, the PCdoB attempted to make a thorough critique of the militaristic and foquista conceptions that were starting to prevail inside the armed groups fighting against the dictatorship.

The splits that took place at that time, stemming from the foquista and militaristic influence within the left and prompting the appearance of the Red Wing and the Revolutionary Communist Party (PCR), barely affected the PCdoB's expansion over the following years.

It is worth underscoring that, though prioritizing work in the countryside, the Party never abandoned its engagement in the cities. As from 1968, for example, the Party strengthened its ties with the student movement. At the National Union of Students (UNE), also forced to go underground, the communists played an important role by providing leaders like Helenira Rezende. In São Paulo, Antônio Guilherme Ribas came to preside over the São Paulo Secondary Students Union (Upes) in 1968. The Patriotic Youth Union (UJP), under the direction of Lincoln Bicalho Roque, boasted hundreds of militants in Rio de Janeiro in the early 1970s.

During this time, the Party never neglected the ideological struggle. It systematically criticized certain conceptions on the Brazilian and Latin American revolution, especially foquismo. The critique was basically presented in two documents, *Alguns problemas ideológicos da revolução na América Latina* [Some ideological issues of the revolution in Latin America] (May 1968) and *Guerra Popular – Caminho da luta armada no Brasil* [Popular War – The Armed Struggle Path in Brazil] (January 1969).

In them the Party combated the underestimated role of the communist parties and mass action in the revolutionary process. It stressed the need to always take into account national particularities when waging the emancipatory struggle of the nations oppressed by imperialism. In the May 1968 document the Party stated that every country has its own peculiarities, its historical background and traditions, its culture and ethnic composition, its habits and customs. Thus, it held that each people would have to find specific forms of approaching the revolution.

In the early 1970s, the PCdoB published *The topicality of Lenin's Ideas* (1970) and *On the anti-imperialist struggle* (1973), in which the Party reasserted the importance of Leninism for the development of Marxism and, from a different angle, refuting misconceptions suggesting the possibility of occasional alliances with the U.S. imperialism.

The Araguaia armed resistance

Especially in the end of 1968, with the promulgation of institutional act AI-5, violence escalated as the military sought to crush their opponents. Detentions, torture, and assassinations had become routine. To stand up to the reign of terror, sectors of the opposition resorted to armed resistance. The communists were on the frontline and started military-political training. Among

the places screened for setting up the resistance, they chose an area in the Amazon region, washed by the Araguaia River, situated between southern Pará, southwestern Maranhão and the northern part of today's Tocantins State.

The flow of militants into the Araguaia region increased in early 1969 because of the worsening of political repression in the cities. Most of the guerrillas were youths, among them several women, who had taken active part in the students' movement. Alongside them also figured early and seasoned communist leaders like João Amazonas, Maurício Grabois, Ângelo Arroyo, and Elza Monnerat. In the woods of the Araguaia generations of communists came together.

In the beginning of 1972 there already were 69 men and women guerrillas, who had formed three detachments and a Military Commission commanded by Maurício Grabois. Their goal was to create the conditions for starting a "prolonged people's war" against the military dictatorship. For that, they started to live with the people, as simple peasants or small traders. Those guerrillas who were doctors, engineers, and teachers used their knowledge to assist local residents. Thus they slowly started to create a bond with the peasants and eventually won their trust. Yet, this work was abruptly interrupted in 1972, with the arrival of military troops in the region and the beginning of the repression.

The guerrillas fought in three military campaigns involving more than 10,000 navy, army,

and air force troops. Between the first and the second campaign, the Guerrilla Forces created the Union for the People's Liberty and Rights (ULDP) and presented a 27-point program based on the local residents' most pressing needs.

On 25 December 1973, the Guerrilla endured its most severe blow with the fall of the Military Commission and the arrest and murder of tens of militants, including its commander, Maurício Grabois.

In April 1974 took place the last combats that culminated in the end of the guerrilla. All the prisoners of this last campaign were tortured and slain. Some 60 casualties are still missing. For its repercussion and the dimensions of the resistance it mobilized, the guerrilla movement contributed to elevate the spirits of the democratic struggle toward defeating the dictatorship, while also deeply marking the local residents. This heroic fight honors the history of the Brazilian people and of the PCdoB.

Repression against the PCdoB had already begun from the very first day of the 1964 coup, with the closure of its press and persecution against its main leaders. Before the beginning of the Guerrilla, Calil Chade, José Duarte, Lincoln Oest and Diógenes Arruda, among others, had already been arrested and tortured. In 1971 in Rio de Janeiro, a young UJP and UBES student militant, Joel Vasconcelos, was brutally killed. But the breaking out of the war in the

Araguaia led to an unprecedented increase in persecution against the communists.

Between late 1972 and early 1973 four national leaders were arrested, tortured, and assassinated: Carlos Danielli, Lincoln Oest, Luís Guilhaardini, and Lincoln Bicalho Roque. In several states the Party was being hunted down, with many arrests and the assassination of valuable cadres. The objective of the military was to isolate the Araguaia in order to stop the resistance from receiving support from the cities. It was the beginning of an operation ultimately designed to eliminate the Party leadership that promoted the Guerrilla. In the years that followed, Armando Frutuoso and Ruy Frazão would also fall.

The gaps opened in the direction and the militant collective by the repression were, to a great extent, filled by the incorporation by the PCdoB of the majority of the members of the Marxist-Leninist People's Action (APML), the largest leftist revolutionary organization at the time. The incorporation of these revolutionary forces reinvigorated the Party with the influence the APML had on the student, workers' and peasants' movement. The process was very successful, constituting a unique phenomenon within the international communist movement. The document approved at the 6th Congress of the PCdoB stated, "The positive feature of the incorporation of the People's Action was the political and organic reinvigoration of the Party, given the degree of combativeness and the

political level of a great many cadres who had been trained under the tough conditions of the anti-Fascist struggle. This reinvigoration took place at the regional level and in the Central Committee, in the 1975 restructuring". And concluded, "The incorporation of the People's Action militants and leaders proved to be most correct and beneficial for the Party".

After the defeat of the Araguaia armed resistance, the PCdoB approved an important document that aimed to adapt the Party's tactic to the new phase of the Brazilian political life, with the inception of the "opening" and the landslide electoral defeat of the regime in 1974. Released in 1975 and known as *Mensagem aos brasileiros* [Message to the Brazilians], the document entitled *Levar adiante e até o fim a luta contra a ditadura* [Carry forward and to the end the fight against the dictatorship] proposed three banners to unify the opposition: broad, general, and unrestricted amnesty; abolition of all exceptional laws; and a call for a Free and Sovereign National Constituent Assembly.

In December 1976, in São Paulo city's Lapa district, a house where a Central Committee meeting had been held was surrounded and machine-gunned by the repression. In this heinous operation, which became known as the Lapa Slaughter, both Ângelo Arroyo and Pedro Pomar were instantly murdered. A while later João Batista Drummond would be tortured to death. Other leaders like

Haroldo Lima, Aldo Arantes, Elza Monnerat and Wladimir Pomar, who had already left the meeting house before the military arrived, were also detained and tortured. This was a severe setback for the Party because, in addition to the country's direction being severely hit, all contact with the remaining cadres had been cut.

Once again it was necessary to carry out a slow process of party restructuring. Amazonas, Arruda, Dynéas Aguiar and Renato Rabelo, who were abroad, led the task, which culminated in the holding of the 7th National Conference of the PCdoB, which took place in Tirana, Albania, between 1978 and 1979. The core of the tactic approved there was “the conquest of the broadest political liberties”, which entailed overthrowing the military regime. Banners were reaffirmed that had already been set in 1975. First, broad, general, and unrestricted amnesty; second, complete and immediate abolition of all arbitrary acts and laws; and third, a freely-elected Constituent Assembly, summoned by a democratic and provisional government.

The PCdoB called for the union of the “broadest political and social forces around the democratic and popular banners”. Still, it was necessary to strengthen the people's opposition inside this broad, antidictatorial front and unite it into the front's “most active core”. The Conference's resolution reaffirmed the Leninist idea that the tactic should be “connected with the strategic ends”

and that “winning complete freedom was not an end in itself. It corresponded to a necessary phase of the political process under way and should serve to advance the liberating struggles”. Hence the prominence gained by the expression “creation of a new, people’s democracy regime (...) in the march toward socialism”.

The 7th Conference also set the task of substantially increasing the number of factory workers in the PCdoB rank-and-file, since “its condition as a proletarian party” was not fulfilled only by its consequential revolutionary politics, but also by its working-class composition.

In the late 1970s, the working class was back to the political scene staging huge strikes. In 1978, in a document called *Maior atenção às reivindicações proletárias* [Greater attention to proletarian demands] the Party pointed out the need to reinforce its engagement in this arena. The emerging trade union movement had become one of its main priorities and the Party had an active participation in the strike movement during that period, especially the metalworkers in, among other places, São Paulo and the greater São Paulo ABC region, Contagem and Betim in Minas Gerais State, Rio de Janeiro, and Porto Alegre and Caxias do Sul in the state of Rio Grande do Sul. The communist militants started to join trade union boards of, among other occupations, metalworkers, subway workers, urban workers and drivers. In line with this effort to strengthen ties with the

workers and raise class consciousness levels, the Center for Workers' Culture (CCO) was created in May 1980, with a seasoned communist leader and worker, José Duarte, at its helm. In 1981, the Party released the document *Por um movimento operário combativo, unido e consciente* [For a combative, united, and conscious workers' movement].

As the 1964 dictatorship declined, the PCdoB once again raised the banner of unity for which it had been fighting since 1945, with the Workers' Unifying Movement (MUT), which in this phase was proposed at the National Conference of the Working Classes (Conclat), held in 1981, and later on, at the General Confederation of Workers (CGT), where trade unionists associated with the Party were engaged until 1988.

In 1978, the highlight was the Movement against the Cost of Living (MCV), later renamed Movement against Scarcity (MCC), which collected 1.3 million signatures and held a huge demonstration on Sé Square in São Paulo. The movement had a ripple effect in many states. In Bahia, in 1981, the popular revolt against high public transportation rates led to an episode that became known as the "Bus-smashing riot". The PCdoB and the progressive sectors of the Catholic Church had an active participation in the organization of a struggle that had a very strong popular appeal. One of its outcomes was the election of communist worker Aurélio Peres in 1978, running on the MDB party label, to the Chamber of

Deputies – the first communist representative to be elected since the Party's reorganization in 1962 and a sign of the growing ties between the party and the state of São Paulo labor movement. Another highlight was the communists' engagement in the amnesty campaign.

In October 1979, to reach out to a broader number of workers and people and orient the Party, was launched mass newspaper *Tribuna da Luta Operária*. In 1981 was created theory, politics, and information review *Princípios*, while in the early 1980s appears the National Education and Training School, which, throughout the decade, would fulfill an important role in educating and building the capacities of party cadres.

At the same time the students' movement took once again to the streets and pushed forward the reorganization of their entities. One of the milestones of this process was the congress for the reconstruction of the UNE, in 1979 in Bahia. The first president of the reconstructed UNE was Party militant Ruy César. Further on, the communists would take the presidency of the Brazilian Secondary Students Union (UBES). Successive PCdoB student leaders would chair these national organizations, while youth organization would become one of the Party's outstanding features.

In 1980, with a view to a more organic PCdoB-led youth movement, was created the São Paulo-based Democratic and Progressive Youth (Ju-depro), a short-lived experience which failed to

reach national status. Also in the 1980s, faction Viração became a landmark in Party coordination and action within the student movement. Later on would be founded the Union of Socialist Youth (UJS).

The last days of the military dictatorship and the Party's legalization (1983-1985)

In the 1982 elections, the PCdoB called for a tactical vote in support of the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB), the largest opposition party, to defeat the dictatorship represented by the Democratic Social Party (PDS). The military regime suffered a humiliating defeat in major states. The opposition made a majority in the Chamber of Deputies and elected 11 governors. The PCdoB, through the PMDB party label, made a delegation of four national representatives: Aurélio Peres, SP, Haroldo Lima, BA, José Luis Guedes, MG, and Aldo Arantes, GO, the last two elected as substitutes who would be sworn in once the new legislative term began. That was a major electoral and political feat by the Party, which also elected representatives to the state legislatures of São Paulo, Amazonas, Alagoas, Pernambuco, Maranhão, and Bahia, plus a number of councilors to several City Councils.

The 6th Congress (1983) approved the tactical line for the final offensive against the dictatorship. Moreover, it signaled to the formation of a

new provisional government, composed of democratic forces and in alliance with the people's unity, capable of ensuring political freedom and calling a Constituent Assembly. An assessment of the Araguaia Guerrilla was also concluded, pointing out its legacy and underscoring the lessons to be learned from the rights and wrongs of this important episode.

In the end of 1983 began the "Direct Elections!" campaign. Huge rallies were held all across the country. For the first time, PCdoB representatives on behalf of its Legality Commission had the opportunity to express themselves to thousands of people. The communists' red flags flooded public squares. A note by the Party read, "The struggle for direct elections appears as a concrete, practical, [and] immediate way of bringing an end to the government of the military". On that occasion the Party fought against narrow-minded visions and tried to maximize the movement's strength by incorporating moderate sectors and the regime's dissidents.

With the defeat of the "Direct Elections" amendment, clamor rose in favor of a single opposition candidate to defeat Paulo Maluf, the candidate of the regime, at the Electoral College. However, the opposition forces, including the PMDB, were not quite sure how to address the issue, which is when the PCdoB's role gains prominence. The Party underscored that the key goal of the struggle was to bring an end to the dictatorship, while going to

the Electoral College was not intended as a way of strengthening the college created by the regime but, rather, of destroying it. After intensive negotiations with the Party's participation, Tancredo Neves accepted the call made by the democratic forces to run against the candidate of the dictatorship at the Electoral College.

Next, the PCdoB released the document *Por que os comunistas apoiam Tancredo* [Why the communists support Tancredo], in which it was stated that, "We cannot entirely reject, in the present situation, the race in the Electoral College imposed by the government if that is indispensable to obtain victory and will contribute to its extinction [the College's]".

Hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets in support of Tancredo, in a great civic campaign with the Party as a main protagonist.

FOURTH PHASE: the communists in the struggle to consolidate democracy and against neoliberalism (1988-2002)

On 15 January 1985, the Electoral College elected Tancredo Neves. This victory buried the college itself, and the dictatorship marched toward its end. With the president-elect's untimely death, Vice-President José Sarney was sworn in.

Direct presidential elections, as well as direct mayoral elections in capital cities, were reestablished and the right to vote extended to the illitera-

te. The new civil government legalized all parties, including the communist.

On 23 May, the Commission for the Legality of the PCdoB, headed by João Amazonas, filed a registration with the Higher Electoral Court. The following month, the Party leaders were received at the Palácio do Planalto by President José Sarney.

Legalized, the Party quickly gained strength due to the prestige earned in the fight against the military dictatorship, during which period about one hundred communist militants were assassinated. A great number of cadres, mostly youths, joined the Party, which was structuring itself nationwide. In order to get its definitive registration from the Electoral Court, in 1987 the PCdoB led an intensive and massive campaign that resulted in a membership of 60,000 militants.

In the 1986 elections for the National Constituent Assembly, the PCdoB elected a five-member delegation with Aldo Arantes (GO), Eduardo Bonfim (AL), Edmilson Valentim (RJ), Haroldo Lima (BA), and Lídice da Mata (BA). Though small, this delegation was very active and combative. Through own amendments or deals, the communists helped to pass key provisions designed to strengthen national sovereignty, broaden democracy, and advance social rights for the people, the workers, women, and black people.

Between 1982 and 1988, the PCdoB sought to enhance its organic influence over the country's

rising mass movement. Accordingly, in 1982 it contributed toward the organization of the National Confederation of Dwellers' Associations (Conam); the Union of Socialist Youth (UJS) in 1984; the Brazilian Women's Union (UBM) in 1988; and the Union of Blacks for Equality (Unegro) in 1988. In the labor movement, the communists, along with other factions, created the Union Class Current (CSC) in 1988. In 1990, the CSC joined the Single Central of Workers (CUT), within which it acted for a few years.

As early as the 1980s the Party was present in the struggle for land in southern Pará, in mid-western Maranhão, and in other regions where important peasant leaders became martyrs, like the members of the Canuto family – the father, João Canuto, and brothers José, Paulo and Orlando, only the last having survived the violence of the landowners; Raimundo Ferreira Lima, a.k.a. Gringo, elected president of the Rural Workers' Trade Union of Conceição do Araguaia; lawyer and former PCdoB representative Paulo Fonteles; and Raimundo Nonato Santos da Silva, a.k.a. Nonatinho, a peasant leader in Santa Luzia do Pindaré (MA). The president of the Workers' Trade Union of Rio Maria (PA), Expedito Ribeiro, was also killed by the landowners in 1991. Over this period, the Party faced the notorious Rural Democratic Union (UDR), the landowners' association. In the 1988 Constituent Assembly, the Party engaged in the peasant mobilizations for land reform and family farming, and

retook a seat at the direction of the National Confederation of Agricultural Workers (Contag).

Presently, the Party continues to nurture its ties with the rural workers' struggle, their movements and trade union entities. Adelino Ramos, a.k.a. Dinho, a peasant leader in the Amazon region and a PCdoB militant murdered in May 2011 in the state of Rondônia, showcases the fact that, in the 21st century, the latifundia continues to carry on with its atavistic violence.

During the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly, the Sarney government leaned right and came closer to the conservative sectors of society, thus prompting the PCdoB to increasingly become more critical of his administration.

In the late 1980s the national development project was at the height of the crisis, a crisis that had started in the second half of the previous decade. The alternative presented by the hegemonic sectors of the dominant class – linked to the financial capital and imperialism – was the implementation of the antidemocratic, antipopular, and antinational neoliberal project.

In May 1988, amid the Sarney government crisis, the Party held its 7th Congress, the first one as a legalized party. The Congress concluded that the “so-called New Republic (...) aged prematurely”; hence the ratification of the word of order Out with Sarney and for Direct [elections] in 1988! It also states that Brazil was at a historical crossroads. “Either it radically breaks up with the current state

of affairs and ensures independent economic development, opens clearings for effective progress, democratization, and the modernization of national life, or we will be mired in a swamp of decadence and submission to the imperialist financial oligarchy". As the new presidential elections neared, the Party stated that "the objective is to influence for the emergence of a democratic and progressive competitor, capable of gathering support from the left as well as from the center. And who may facilitate the formation of a democratic and national people's broad and combative movement".

The Popular Brazil Front and the fight against neoliberalism

As a result of this guideline, the Party amended its alliance policy and raised the banner of leftist unity. In practice, this new policy would result in several alliances with the PT in the 1988 mayoral elections. In early 1989, the PCdoB called the democratic and popular forces to unite around a single candidacy to run in the presidential election. This effort resulted in the constitution of the Popular Brazil Front (PT-PSB-PCdoB), with Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva as its presidential candidate.

The campaign gained momentum as crowds took to squares and avenues painted red with the leftist flags. Lula went to the second round and almost got elected president. The PCdoB was one of the first to correctly interpret that Fernando

Collor de Mello's electoral win had ushered in a new phase in the struggle of the Brazilian people. Neoliberalism, already hegemonic in many parts of the world, found in the Collor government better conditions to enter the country.

Right from the start, the PCdoB advocated that the fight against neoliberalism should be at the core of the strategy of the democratic, patriotic and popular forces. The Party raised the "Collor out" banner, while its youth was the protagonist of a campaign that drew broad sectors of the Brazilian people. Millions took to the streets to call for the impeachment of the president of the republic, a goal accomplished in 1992.

With Fernando Henrique Cardoso's electoral win, neoliberalism gained further impetus. The PCdoB reacted strongly and took to the vanguard of the fight against the dismantling of the Brazilian State, against the withdrawal of the social rights of workers, and against threats to democracy. It sternly denounced the criminal privatization process. Moreover, the Party strengthened the National Forum of Struggles (FNL), which united people's and workers' entities with leftwing parties.

The FNL had an agenda that was both varied and intense in mobilizations. Among them stands out the March of the 100,000 to the federal capital Brasília, in 1999, with the handing over to the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies of a petition with one million and three hundred thousand signatures demanding FHC to be held criminally

liable and the opening up of a congressional probe to investigate the privatization of national telecom system Telebrás. In all these struggles the communists played a prominent role.

In early 2000 was released the Manifesto in Defense of Brazil, Democracy and Work. The document, written with the decisive participation of the PCdoB, represented a first attempt to summarize the program of the progressive forces, given the great political/electoral showdowns that were nearing.

The Party defended the building of a broad opposition front with the leftist forces at its core, backing a national and democratic program focused on the overcoming of neoliberalism and sustained by a broad mass movement.

Reaffirming socialism on new foundations

Since the late 1980s, the PCdoB was one of the few parties to rise against the policy adopted by Gorbachev, denouncing it as the USSR's road back to capitalism. After the fall of socialism in Eastern Europe and in the USSR, the Party made a call for the left to conduct a deep critique of such experiences; to reflect about the defeats, yet without making concessions to the 'neoliberalizing' wave that was driving several communist parties to annihilation. It was necessary to acknowledge the crisis of socialism and of the revolutionary theory itself and to fight to overcome them.

Such a situation prompted the Party, for one, to reaffirm its principles and, for another, to carry out a critical examination of the previous experience in order to be able to restart it within the new and troubled world and national setting that was dawning. The culmination of this process was the 8th Congress (1992), whose banner was Socialism lives! and the 8th Conference (1995), which approved the Socialist Program. Victorious, the Congress and the Conference reaffirmed socialism on new foundations and contributed to the challenge of enriching and updating the Marxist theory.

The 8th Congress also represented an important shift in relation to the way the PCdoB used to see the unity of the communist movement. In face of the strategic defeat resulting from the end of the USSR, there were changes within the movement. Parties from several countries conducted critical analyses and self-criticisms in an effort to seek new perspectives for the revolutionary struggle. Accordingly, the 8th Congress proposed the unity of all of the world's organizations that reaffirmed their communist identity. And thus was the end of the phase that began with the schism between the USSR and China in the early 1960s. All at once, the PCdoB set out to call for the unity of the movement.

This correction of its international relations policy line also stemmed from a self-critical analysis the PCdoB made with regard to the mistakes con-

tained in its appraisal of the evolution of the international context – between the late 1960s and the 1980s. Within the scope of the just political, theoretical and ideological fight waged against revisionism, the Party committed mistakes, mostly in the characterization of the role played by countries that had made up the former socialist camp.

In these years, the communists had significant participation in the protests against the U.S. imperialist military offensive. They denounced the first aggression to Iraq (1991) and the invasion of Yugoslavia (1999). They had the same conduct when Bush decided to promote his “infinite war”, with the second war against Iraq (2003) and the aggressions against Afghanistan (2001) and Libya (2011) – the last one initiated during the Obama administration.

In 2008, due to the role played by the PCdoB in the anti-imperialist struggle and for world peace, communist leader Socorro Gomes was elected president of the prestigious World Peace Council, while the first meeting of communist parties to be held outside Europe took place in Brazil, hosted that same year by the PCdoB.

FIFTH PHASE: Toward the victory of the country's project of change (2002-2012)

Lula's election in 2002 defeated neoliberalism's offensive. It restored, under new circumstances,

the struggle for the country's sovereign and democratic development. Because of the prominent role the PCdoB played in this great victory of the people, the Party was invited to join ministries of the federal government.

In light of this unprecedented situation in the history of Brazil, the Party was forced to reflect and set guidelines regarding its presence in a central government coalition where the communists were a minority force. Imposed by a reality in constant transformation, new theoretical and political challenges emerged.

The Party underlined the need to develop its political thought. The 9th Conference, in 2003, accurately noted that Lula's victory had ushered in a new historical and political cycle in Brazil – not just a mere change of government.

Conditions would come to exist for the construction of a democratic, national-developmental, and progressive project steered by new political and social forces more closely connected with the interests of the workers and the Nation. "The failure of the Lula administration would also be the failure of the leftist and renewing forces but, most importantly, a path for the return of the conservative forces to the center of power", stated the Party. The core of the tactic was defined as "acting for the success of the Lula government in steering changes consisting of deepening democracy and adopting a national development project, focused on the defense

of the country's sovereignty and social progress". The Party also set three broad lines for the accumulation of forces: participation in governments and legislatures, in the ideological struggle, and in the social movement.

With the Lula government, the Party was invited for the first time to join the federal cabinet, assuming the Ministry of Sports.

In 2005, Representative Aldo Rebelo (PCdoB-SP) was elected speaker of the Chamber of Deputies just as a coup maneuvers were being plotted to destabilize the government and ultimately impeach President Lula. Aldo's election barred the opposition's offensive and represented a decisive step toward overcoming this grave political crisis. It is worth underlining that the PCdoB was the most combative party in the fight against the putsch planned by the opposition and the Brazilian media.

At the same time, the Party issued the slogan Stay Lula! and led popular mobilizations in defense of the president's mandate. An important date in this process was the 16th of August of 2005, when a great demonstration in Brasília repudiated the attempted coup and defended the legitimate mandate of the president. This action was called by the Coordination of Social Movements (CMS), and was marked by the protagonism of the youth and the students, with an outstanding participation of the Union of Socialist Youth.

Assertiveness and audacity: the political and electoral tactic

In 2007, after Lula's reelection and with a more favorable correlation of forces at home and abroad, the communists' tactic shifted: audacity in steering the Party's and the advanced forces' political conduct. Under the aegis of a more affirmative political conduct, the Party implemented actions on all of its working fronts, whereas electoral action was qualitatively altered. It was also concluded that the Party had failed in fully understanding the dimension elections had acquired in the struggle for power in Brazil and in the whole of Latin America. By not launching majoritarian candidacies, the communists' participation was cut by half and, concretely concealed inside the coalitions. In the eyes of the people the label presented itself as a secondary force.

Thus, the Party changed its electoral tactic by simultaneously setting the target of growing both in proportional races to the Chamber of Deputies and to all other legislatures and in majoritarian elections to the Federal Senate, city halls, and state governments.

The Party's positive results in the 2010 elections proved the correctness of this shift. In relation to the 2006 elections to the Chamber of Deputies, the Party's votes grew by 40.83% in absolute terms, totaling 2,791,694 votes, with the Party's delegation rising from 13 to 15 represen-

tatives. As for the Senate, in relation to 2002 the Party nearly doubled its votes in 2010, with 12,561,716 votes, or 7.37% of total votes, as opposed to 4% in 2002. With this significant result, the PCdoB, of all party labels, was the fourth most voted to the Federal Senate. Thus, it outperformed its 2006 result when it ranked fifth, plus winning two seats in the Senate, held by Inácio Arruda and Vanessa Grazziotin. Still regarding the senatorial race, a highlight was the number of votes received by Netinho de Paula, a black artist with great popular appeal. Although he was not elected, he got almost eight million votes in São Paulo. The Party also ran with Flávio Dino to the government of the state of Maranhão but, despite an outstanding voting, lost the contest. Moreover, the PCdoB elected 18 men and women representatives to state legislatures.

With the new electoral conduct, in 2008 the Party led thrilling mayoral campaigns. It launched candidates in seven capital cities and in tens of municipalities. And in 2012, besides contesting in several capital cities' mayoral elections, it intends to run in some twenty mid-sized cities.

In the social movement sphere, the Party's audacity led to the creation of a great instrument for the workers. Always seeking class broadening, unity, and combativeness, in 2007 the communists led the creation of the Confederation of Workers of Brazil (CTB). Today the CTB, a class-oriented and plural trade union national center,

boasts impressive penetration and strength in the labor movement, its main banners being a reduced workweek and workers' unity. In 2010, jointly with Brazil's other four national trade union confederations (CUT, Força Sindical, Nova Central and CGTB), the CTB played a key part in the second Conclat, with the participation of 30,000 workers at Pacaembú Stadium in the city of São Paulo. This event approved the Agenda of the Working Class containing the guiding axes for its mobilizations.

At the municipal level, the PCdoB elected mayors whose administrations were approved and supported by the people. Today the Party is at the head of 42 city halls, plus having 66 vice-mayors and 608 councilors all over Brazil. Two cities stand out: Aracaju, the first state capital to be run by a communist, Edvaldo Nogueira, and Olinda, where for three consecutive terms since 2000, the PCdoB elected its candidates Luciana Santos and Renildo Calheiros. The Party has also held offices in many state and municipal bodies and departments, as well as in councils and mixed-economy companies at the three levels of the Federation.

Over the past years, the PCdoB has had a prominent participation in the effort to draft and implement a new national development project. The first steps toward that goal were taken in the positive eight-year period in which Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was at the head of the central po-

wer of the Republic. Now, President Dilma Rousseff has the challenging mission of pushing the process further.

New Statute

An important decision of the 11th Congress, held in 2005, was the approval of the new Party Statute, which was drafted on the basis of the theoretical reflections and practical activity conducted by the Party over its twenty years of legal activity, which enabled innovative experiences. The Statute reaffirms the organization's Leninist principles: a proletarian, vanguard, internationalist party governed by democratic centralism. Yet the new statutory charter consolidated, enhanced, and innovated on the basis of the experience accumulated. The Statute combined the upholding of a revolutionary, class-oriented, Marxist, and militant transformative organization with a sense of renewal, the key to signaling to society the Party's ideas, its political project. The Statute conferred upon the Party a sense of modernity in terms of principles and features, in line with the real movement and contemporary characteristics, particularly the peculiarities of the Brazilian political and social movement.

The Statute has a more dialectical view of the complex relation between affiliated members, militants, and cadres, establishing differentiated rights, duties, and levels of responsibility, and trans-

lating the political culture forged in the intricate democratization process of the Brazilian society post military regime. Affiliated Party members, rather than mere compliance with the electoral law, are conceived as a constituent element of the Party, which does not give up being, fundamentally, a party of cadres and of broad organic militancy.

The norm of democratic centralism enshrined in the Statute enhanced conception and practice, while also underpinning democratic centralism on the secrecy of the vote to elect party directions and on freedom of opinion and personal expression. Though this freedom does stimulate debate, it does not dispense with the obligation to disseminate and stand up for party opinions built by a majority. The Party coexists with differences of opinion yet does not make use of them to stimulate fragmentation but, rather, to build a single core and a single orientation, on the basis of a contract freely and consciously entered into by all: democratic centralism.

The new Statute established regulations for the ancillary committees, created collectives (though still as an exceptional form of organization), and introduced the secret ballot for the election of party leading collectives. It entrenched the indispensable notion of autonomy for social entities and movements in leading the struggle of the working people. It set forth a norm providing for a regular call for the Party's National Conference

on Women's Emancipation and the creation of a Permanent National Forum on the same theme.

The 11th Congress singled out that one of the main tasks for the following period should be to bring the Socialist Program, as approved in 1995, up to date. A main parameter for this updating should be the establishment of a better relation between strategic objective, socialism, and the tactical roads to get there.

The Congress also analyzed the significance of President Lula's first term of office concluding that "(...) the installation of the Lula government (...) meant the victory of new political and social vanguard forces which had never reached the government of the Republic (...). The new government, elected within the institutional framework in force, for its social and political origin, commitments and composition, represented a new level in the struggle against neoliberalism, assuming a more advanced democratic posture".

12th Congress: updating of Socialist Program and prospects for Brazil

Held in 2009, the 12th Congress reviewed President Lula's two terms in office. Its political resolution underscored that the Party should fight to ensure the continuity of the progressive cycle inaugurated in 2002, striving to deepen the changes further. It also confirmed the struggle between the forces that wished for "a change toward a

national development project” and the “conservative countertendency”, which represented all the damage brought about by neoliberalism.

The Congress reported on the international setting as marked, on the one hand, by a continued imperialist offensive against the peoples, resulting in a more unstable and dangerous world; and, on the other, by the relative decline of United States imperialism and the rise of new powers, notably China.

The chairmanship of the Party for the 2006/2009 term adopted a range of initiatives aimed at updating the Socialist Program. Debates and seminars are held, and PCdoB cadres and Marxist and progressive leaders and intellectuals are called to give their contribution by publishing essays and articles, which are mainly focused on the contemporary phenomena taking place in Brazil and across the world. This endeavor provided a body of reflections that helped bring the Program approved in 1995 up to date.

The 12th Congress took a step further by updating the Party’s cadre policy. This up-to-date cadre policy was built on the conviction that the cadre is the most dynamic element of the Party’s political action and its main builder. Cadres not only ensure that militants are linked to each other in rank-and-file organizations and in the Municipal Committee (MC), but also ensure the linkages between the bases and the directing bodies, and between the Party as a whole and the people. Once

a just policy has been set, the other decisive factor for the Party's success or failure is its body of cadres. Universally accepted by the communist movement, this statement is concretely materialized, in the case of the PCdoB, through an up-to-date policy that builds on a single premise: cadres for these times and for today's concrete mission. These times – the times of capitalism shrouded in a huge crisis posing threats, risks and opportunities, while in Latin America and in Brazil a cycle of people's victories is unfolding. The mission – the new struggle for socialism. Notwithstanding its expansion and achievements, the Party is pressured to downgrade its role and compromise its revolutionary essence. Cadres, once in rising theoretical, political, and ideological growth, are the defense and weapon available for the Party to move forward without losing sight of its programmatic and strategic objectives.



The legacy to the Nation and the workers

The Party's contributions to the construction of Brazil and to the workers' struggles are the fruits of the revolutionary militancy of generations of communists and of many heroes and martyrs of the Brazilian people. With each new generation, new leaders stand out who will earn prestige and authority both with the militant collective and the democratic and progressive forces.

In 90 years of action spanning the 122 years of the existence of the Federative Republic of Brazil, the communists –their ideals, struggles, and accomplishments– have helped to shape Brazil. To begin with, the legacy includes projecting the workers and the people into the country's political life, constantly raising class consciousness and strengthening the unity and capacity of struggle of the workers' and people's entities and movements. It comprises a remarkable record of battles and clashes targeting the construction of a sovereign and democratic Nation, with well-being for its people and rights for its workers.

The Party has always stood up for peace and solidarity among the peoples, while always rejecting imperialist wars and spoliation. Its parliamentary action, from the three last Constituent Assemblies of the republican era to the present days, has been marked by combativeness, democratic coexistence, and unswerving defense of the interests of the Nation and the rights of the people.

In addition, especially after 2003, the PCdoB has taken up government responsibilities and contributed to advance the national development project.

Invaluable contributions have been made by the Party, its cadres, and other Marxist thinkers in the form of studious inquiry into and interpretations of Brazil and those themes indispensable for the transformative journey. Renowned exponents of arts and culture have joined the Party and continue to gather to strengthen the Brazilian culture.

A synthesis of its accomplishments is the rooting of a revolutionary force in the Nation. A force that was coherent in both preserving the communist identity and finding the means to strengthen itself by learning from its practice's rights and wrongs. Moreover, it was mature enough to rejuvenate and renew socialism on the basis of the lessons learned from history.

This synthesis manifests itself in the growing accumulation of forces of the Communist Party of Brazil in the 2010s; a party with an uninterrupted and dynamic life, always ready to engage on the various fronts of struggle, with a growing militant collective, and respected by the political and progressive camp. A Party guided by a Socialist Program conceived in the context of the contemporary world, aligned with the country's historical background and embedded in the course of the real political struggle. A Program with a course (socialism) and a path (the new National Development Project).

Its track record of accomplishments is the result of the revolutionary militancy of a few generations of communists and the many communist heroes and countless martyrs of the Brazilian people whose memories, just as they are honored, are still providing the revolutionary energy driving today's struggle.

The legacy of the Communist Party of Brazil to the Nation and the workers dates back to its founders, symbolically represented by the talent of Astrojildo Pereira, proceeds in the tumultuous and enriching years of the mid-20th century, when the name of popular leader Luiz Carlos Prestes most prominently stands out, and culminates in the present days with the critical role played by João Amazonas as builder and ideologue of the Communist Party, a party that flourished and expanded in the last 40 years of the 20th century.

Today, under the direction of Renato Rabelo the Party continues to grow just as it keeps building up its capacity to meet the challenges posed by the new struggle for socialism arising from the paradoxes of contemporary capitalism and the advance of the transformative movement.

Four leading collectives conducted the Party throughout its existence. Each of them led the militant collective through a host of struggles that have resulted in an invaluable heritage of contributions to the Brazilian people.

THE FIRST GENERATION

The founders. The party of the workers, the people and socialism is born.

In March 1922, the Communist Party of Brazil is founded by a fearless group of workers: Abílio de Nequete, barber; Astrojildo Pereira, journalist; Cristiano Cordeiro, public employee; Hermogênio da Silva, electrician; João da Costa Pimenta, press worker; Joaquim Barbosa, tailor; José Elias da Silva, public employee; Luís Peres, broom factory worker; and Manuel Cendón, tailor.

They were – as attested by their professions – ordinary people, leaders of the nascent working class, some with little theoretical background, yet with a deeply-rooted revolutionary enthusiasm and iron-strong will to fight for socialism. Among them, Astrojildo Pereira stands out for his persistent militancy and for his qualities as party leader, as he was the party's general secretary for most of the 1920s. Another prominent leader was Octávio Brandão, both for his pioneering Marxist study on Brazil and for the fact that he was one of the Party's first lawmakers.

The very founding of the Party constitutes in itself the epic legacy of these pioneers.

During the Old Republic the Party acquired one of its distinctive features: in a country marked by lengthy periods of absence of democracy, a Party emerged that was hardened in combat against dictatorships and the defense of liberty.

With regard to the partisan/political system, the communists were among the first to defend mandatory secret ballot voting, with the inclusion of women and soldiers. Even then, the communists already defended the proportional representation system on the basis of electoral quotients and party list voting. The Worker and Peasant Bloc (BOC) successfully inaugurated a policy of alliances with the advanced political forces to stand up against the power of the dominant classes in the electoral struggle.

To the Old Republic, social movements were a 'police matter'. In this hostile environment, the fledgling party boldly set out to organize the workers and to create and strengthen its trade unions and associations. Its guidelines: Working-class mobilization and unity.

The Party pioneered a broad agenda of social and labor rights that comprised the Vacation Law, the Work Accidents Law, the Pensions Law; the eight-hour workday and the 44-hour working week; a ban on the employment of children aged 14 or under; the minimum wage and collective bargaining agreements; State- and employer-sponsored social security for the protection of the elderly, and unemployment, invalidity and sickness insurance; maternity leave to pregnant workers, 60 days prior to and 60 days after delivery, with full pay; and the weekly rest. After the 1930 Revolution and much struggling, many of these rights came true and were enshrined in the 1941 national labor code *Consolidação das Leis Trabalhistas* (CLT) and in the 1946 Constitution.

Besides proletarian, the Party was born patriotic and internationalist. It analyzed the rivalry between the British imperialism, hegemonic in the spoliation of the country, and the expanding United States imperialism. It denounced both and defended national sovereignty. It furthered the working-class tradition of vigorously opposing imperialist wars and championing peace, as had happened during the First World War. It campaigned against Fascism, which had already taken power in Italy.

The founders valued the struggle of ideas and endeavored to strengthen the communist and workers' press. They were also the first to sow the seeds of Marxism in the country. Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and other authors were published, as well as texts about Soviet Russia. Seminal interpretations of the Brazilian reality in the light of Marxism are produced. Otávio Brandão's 1926 book *Agrarismo e Industrialismo* [Agrarianism and Industrialism] is an outstanding example of the insightfulness that sought to apprehend Brazil's singularities and the country's own road to transformation.

THE SECOND GENERATION

**Standing up against Fascism,
Party expansion, struggle for
industrialization, and organizing the
people and workers**

In 1935, after the ANL uprising, the Party direction was heavily repressed. This situation was further

compounded with the decreeing of the New State in November 1937. The Party was virtually left without a structured national direction. A more stable, second leading collective started to be formed that, despite divergence and alterations, would conduct the Party until 1956. This committee was made up of the organizers of the Mantiqueira Conference (1943) and the leaders elected there to the Central Committee: Diógenes Arruda, Maurício Grabois, Pedro Pomar, João Amazonas, Amarílio Vasconcelos, Júlio Sérgio de Oliveira, Mário Alves, Luiz Carlos Prestes and Carlos Marighella. In this group Prestes's presence stood out, as he was a great popular leader whose heroism at the head of the "Invincible Column", a great feat of the Tenentes movement, had granted him the title of "Knight of Hope". He joined the Party in 1934 by the hands of the Communist International. After the 1935 insurrection, he remained in prison for nine years. He brought prestige and authority upon the Party, inside and outside the country.

From 1930 to 1964, the Party was legal for only one year, six months, and ten days. Yet it is misguided to assume that the legal banning should have dulled its political and organizing edge. In spite of the crackdown, the communists were never intimidated, never gave up their historical role. And the same occurred during other dictatorial cycles. A merit of that generation, which was bequeathed to the next generations, was to keep the Party active even when persecuted by reactionary regimes. In 1945, with the winds of freedom blowing, the

Party wisely seized the moment to open its doors, expand its militancy and area of influence, and put up a strong representation in Parliament.

Its democratic legacy is portrayed in the great struggles against Nazi-Fascism and against its ‘tropical’ face, Integralism; and also in the fierce struggle against the truculent authoritarianism of the time, especially of the New State and the Dutra government. The Party was engaged in building a people’s democratic and anti-imperialist front to fight against Nazi-Fascism. The National Alliance for Freedom (ANL) was the epitome of this policy. There were a number of initiatives against the war, imperialism, Fascism and for peace. In the foreign arena, by centering its attack on the United States imperialism and appealing to patriotism, the Party significantly helped to impart consciousness and anti-imperialist and national sovereignty sentiment in the people.

The 1946 Constituent Assembly

In the 1946 Constituent Assembly the Party played a remarkable part, marked by uncompromising defense of democracy, the workers’ rights, land reform, and national sovereignty. Moreover, it stood up to defend and carried out the propaganda of the socialist experience taking place in the Soviet Union. The Party was also the most consistent force when it came to defending democracy with broad people’s participation. It advocated that all citizens should be entitled to vote, including soldiers and the illiterate.

In consequence, it faced the conservative fury that merely sought a formal democracy with restrictions on the right to organize in political parties and curtailed freedom of assembly and of expression.

The Party's constituent delegates engaged in intense debates on a number of issues, which resulted in the 179 amendments submitted by the communist representation. Despite the rejections, the Constitution entrenched many rights proposed by the communists, such as ensuring freedom of opinion, religion, conscience, assembly, association, of thought and expression; freedom to organize in trade unions and the right to strike (albeit with limitations); and complete equality of rights with no distinction of sex, religion, or nationality.

Though not included on the new Constitution's agenda of debates, the communist legislative delegation also demanded the return of the areas occupied by U.S. military bases in Brazilian territory.

Commitment to the workers' struggles and industrialization

In the cities, embedded in the factories, the Party founded national workers' organizations like the MUT and the CTB, and led countless strikes and struggles. The communists also braved the vastness of the Brazilian countryside founding trade unions, peasant associations, organizing and seeking to raise the level of consciousness of working men and women in the city and the countryside.

In 1937, the Communist Youth, which had been created ten years earlier, had a relevant role in the founding of the National Union of Students, the UNE. In 1948, the communist youths also took part in the establishment of the Brazilian Union of Secondary Level Students, the UBES. At the same time, they engaged in the creation of organizations and movements to rally women, such as the Women's Federation of Brazil, in 1949.

In this period, the Party increased its agitation and propaganda effort by setting up the largest press network in its history, thus enabling broad dissemination of its policy and the spreading of Marxism and socialism.

The Party battled for the development of the productive forces and for the setting in place of the basic conditions required for the country's industrialization. After the proceedings of the 1946 Constituent Assembly, the communists submitted bills intended to establish a defense system of the Brazilian interests based on State and private initiatives. State oil monopoly and the establishment of state-owned oil company Petrobras and steel mill Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional (CSN) are accomplishments towards which the Party greatly contributed.

Boosting the Brazilian culture

Throughout its history the Communist Party of Brazil, guided by the understanding that culture

is an integral part of the national identity and a determining factor in raising the consciousness, prospects, and the quality of life of the people, strived to support and strengthen Brazilian culture. In conducting this task the Party established ties with the intellectuality and with the world of culture. Though a few mistakes occurred in the dynamics of this relationship at given moments, it is undeniable that the communists contributed to the building of the modern Brazilian culture.

Cultural exponents joined the communist party or established ties of friendship with it. Writers like Jorge Amado, Graciliano Ramos, Oswald de Andrade, Patrícia Galvão (Pagu), Dalcídio Jurandir, and Lila Ripoll; names of the architecture and the fine arts, like Oscar Niemeyer, Vilanova Artigas, Di Cavalcanti, Tarsila do Amaral, Cândido Portinari, and Carlos Scliar; playwrights and actors like Gianfrancesco Guarnieri, Francisco Milani, Oduvaldo Vianna Filho (Vianinha), and Dias Gomes; musicians Cláudio Santoro and Guerra Peixe; filmmakers like Ruy Santos, Alex Viany, and Nelson Pereira dos Santos; scientists like Mário Schenberg; athletes like João Saldanha. All of them helped modernize Brazilian culture and society.

The effort to learn about and interpret Brazil

Rugged, long, and hard is the road the Party traverses to master and enrich Marxism and, with

Marxist tools, to learn about and interpret Brazil for the purpose of transforming the country. This is the intellectual and political effort of generations, in which the capacity of collectives and champions produced a highly respected collection of texts, documents, and books about the Brazilian and the world reality. The whole endeavor was linked to the complex activity of drafting the strategy for the Brazilian revolution. Especially the programs, but also the documents approved in congresses, conferences, and other events, are repositories of this rich and diverse production.

In addition to the documents and texts approved by party spheres, invaluable theoretical contributions were authored by Party leaders and militants, among whom we can mention Astrojildo Pereira, Octávio Brandão, Leôncio Basbaum, Caio Prado Jr., Nelson Werneck Sodré, Alberto Passos Guimarães, Rui Facó, Paula Beiguelman, Clóvis Moura, Edgar Carone, Jacob Gorender, Mário Alves, Pedro Pomar, Maurício Grabois, and João Amazonas.

THE THIRD GENERATION

The reorganizers. The Party still on the revolutionary path and the fearless fight against the military dictatorship

From 1957 to 1960, the second leading generation split into two wings. One of these wings founded a new party, the Brazilian Communist Party, a guild that absorbed and endorsed the ideological

and moral blow dealt by Khrushchev against the heroic history of the USSR, and adopted a program permeated with national reformism. The other wing, in very adverse conditions yet driven by coherence and political courage, made the decision to reorganize the historical communist banner founded in 1922. This process was consummated with the holding of the Extraordinary Conference of 18 February 1962, which ensured the revolutionary continuity of the Communist Party of Brazil, thereafter known by the acronym PCdoB. At the head of this far-reaching event were such leaders as João Amazonas, Maurício Grabois, Pedro Pomar, Carlos Danielli, Ângelo Arroyo, Lincoln Oest, José Duarte, and Elza Monnerat. Because Amazonas, Grabois, and Pomar had held high positions in the Party and in public life since the mid-1940s, they were determinant for the success of the reorganization, a process that symbolizes the invaluable legacy of this generation of communist leaders.

For this reason, in the history of the Communist Party of Brazil, February 18, 1962 rivals in importance with the date the PCdoB was founded – 25 March 1922.

The current performance of the PCdoB (present in various dimensions of the country's political life, rooted in the people's and workers' struggles, waving the banner of socialism and engaged in the strengthening of the country) is in itself a demonstration of the rightness and high value of that decision in defense of the Party.

Araguaia: radical commitment to democracy

With the 1964 coup, the newly-reorganized PCdoB had its baptism of fire. The Nation's challenge was to defeat the military dictatorship and conquer democracy and freedom – a journey that would take two decades at the cost of many lives. The Party provided a correct interpretation of the disastrous meaning and reach of the dictatorship, in addition to a definition of the alliance policy and forms of struggle most adequate to fight the military. The core of the tactical orientation was the broad front, combined with mass political struggle, democratic and patriotic banners, and resort to armed struggle.

The Araguaia Guerrilla, a milestone in the armed resistance against the military dictatorship terror, is a heroic page in the history of the PCdoB and the Brazilian people. By their leading role, the communists once again expressed their radical commitment to democracy. The Araguaia resistance raised the spirits of the general struggle against the dictatorship, while shattering the myth of a regime that claimed to be untouchable. In spite of the atrocities inflicted upon them, the people living in the region looked up to the guerrillas to scale up their own fights. The example set by the heroes and heroines of the Araguaia are still a source of inspiration that motivates many youths to engage in the social and political struggle for the construction of a new world.

Forty years on, this is still a recurrent theme on the country's political agenda. It shall be a main issue on the agenda of the recently created Truth Commission. And this is yet another positive legacy the Party hands down: to prevent, at present and in the future, the Brazilian State from committing the same atrocities and heinous crimes against the Nation's own children.

Remaking the third-generation leading collective

Fight against the dictatorship, the redemocratization, legalization and expansion of the Party, struggle against neoliberalism, Popular Brazil Front Popular, and reaffirmation of socialism on new foundations

The composition of the third-generation leading collective was altered because of the absences represented by the assassination of leaders by the military dictatorship. João Amazonas, who had already participated in the Party's reconstruction in 1943 and in the 1962 reorganization, took the head of the leading collective, now recomposed with reinforcements from a broad majority of the members of the Marxist-Leninist Popular Action and from the Party's original rank-and-file cadres. From 1973 to the first years after its legalization in 1985 this leading collective was, in addition to

João Amazonas, composed of Diógenes Arruda, Dynéas Aguiar, Renato Rabelo, Haroldo Lima, Aldo Arantes, Ronald Freitas, Elza Monnerat, Péricles de Souza, Rogério Lustosa, and João Batista Lemos.

From 1975 until 1985, the Party kept abreast of the political developments and started to draw conclusions from the dictatorship's progressive decline. At the right moment, it adjusted the tactic adopted to face the regime. Then, it called with accurate timing for the counteroffensive and also for the unleashing of the "final offensive" that culminated in the "Direct Elections Now!" campaign and the victory of Tancredo Neves at the Electoral College. Such conduct helped to unite the democratic forces and restore democracy in 1985.

The Communist Party of Brazil strived to engage the workers, the people, and the youth in this democratic journey. It became the main political force in the students' movement, which led to the strengthening of the students' political role. PCdoB militants and the Party's large area of influence were largely responsible for the reorganization of the UNE, the UBES, and of its grassroots base, as well as for the founding of the National Association of Graduate Students (ANPG). In the workers' movement, Party actions targeted class unity, mobilization, and increased class consciousness.

The Party's paramount tactical objective was accomplished with the call for the 1988 Constituent Assembly. For the communists, the greatest achieve-

vement of the Constitution was the reinstatement of the Rule of Law in the country. Important constitutional provisions had the contribution of the PCdoB, either directly or by merging amendments. Overall the communist delegation submitted 1,002 amendments, of which 204 were either partially or entirely enacted. Included among the Party's most significant proposals are a parliamentary regime of government, with Brazil's own characteristics; the armed forces with the role of defending national sovereignty; antilatifundium land reform; freedom of religion; the concept of Brazilian national capital company; the inviolability of a person's home; permission for citizens' legislative initiatives; a wage floor proportional to the complexity of the task performed; the six-hour working day for uninterrupted shifts; freedom of association and single trade union representation ("unicity" rule); increasing the number of councilors in municipalities with up to five million inhabitants; simultaneous review of civil and military public employees' wages, with the same indices; the right to vote for those aged 16-plus; the right to strike; norms for urban reform, and many others.

The labor, student, dwellers' and all other movements in which the Party is present have written, since the 1990s, one of the most combative pages in the history of struggle of the Brazilian working men and women: The resistance against the neoliberal offensive. In mobilizations, small or massive, and on an everyday basis –that is how the fight was waged.

8th Congress, 1992, renewed socialism

The three-year period from 1989 to 1991 was marked by the fall of the Eastern European governments and the end of the Soviet Union. During this period a reactionary and anti-Communist wave swept across the globe. Imperialism marched against the peoples. Many theretofore revolutionary parties deserted, changed their colors and name; but not the PCdoB. At its 8th Congress (1992), the Party faced and vanquished this avalanche, while conducting a critical and self-critical review of its own course and of the first cycle of the socialist experiences.

The Congress underscored the fertile legacy of the USSR to humanity and systematized the rights and wrongs of that experience. In the end it reaffirmed socialism on new bases, rejuvenated by the lessons of history. A lesson that took precedence was that there is no single model either for socialism or the revolution. The building of socialism presupposes stages and phases. Its conquest and construction depend on each nation's historical time and economic, social, and cultural reality.

The task was completed at the 8th National Conference (1995), which approved a new Socialist Program. With it, the transformative essence of Marxism was restored.

João Amazonas, then already 80 years old, directed the theoretical, ideological, and political work of the collective of cadres and militants to face and

defeat the outcomes of the strategic defeat of the socialist camp. He gave a relevant theoretical contribution by drawing on the category of transition toward the construction of socialism with national particularities, an important component of Lenin's theoretical thought that had been overshadowed by dogmatism. Once again Amazonas played a key role for the Party's revolutionary continuity.

The communists' contribution to the 2002 victory

In face of the neoliberal offensive unleashed in the early 1990s, the Party called the leftist parties and the social movements to lead an effort to build a national, democratic, and popular opposition front.

Since the first round of the memorable 1989 presidential campaign the Party had supported workers' leader Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, reaffirming such support with every new Lula campaign. In December 2001, convinced that Lula was bound to win in the 2002 presidential elections, the 10th Congress of the PCdoB approved a "national reconstruction" platform. The communists also underscored that only a broad front composed of a broad spectrum of political forces and supported by the social movement at large would be able to win and govern. The Lula-José Alencar ticket materialized this guideline and came out victorious.

The PCdoB, in supporting Lula in each of his campaigns, by offering programmatic ideas and

tactical guidelines that proved indispensable, made meaningful contributions to the historic victory of 2002 – a fact that Lula himself has often publicly extolled, particularly the role played by João Amazonas.

THE FOURTH GENERATION

The challenges of the new struggle for socialism in the 21st century, non-hegemonic participation of the Party in the national coalition government, setting the path and the course – the new Socialist Program, renewed revolutionary party, affirmative and audacious political and electoral tactic

At 10th Congress, held in Rio de Janeiro in December 2001, and after four decades as the PCdoB's main leader, builder and ideologue, João Amazonas concluded that his mission as president was over. Thus, Renato Rabelo was elected president of the Party, office he has held since late 2001, while João Amazonas was acclaimed president of honor in recognition for his legacy.

In these new conditions, with the Party in legality and with a growing presence in the country's political scene, Renato renewed the concept and method underpinning the Party's direction by setting in place a system of collective direction, led by the National Presidency. The National Political

Commission (CPN) became the dynamic and actual center of the Party's political direction and construction. Under this concept, the National Secretariat performs an executive function while the Central Committee (CC) underpins the Party's directive power. The president exercises the leadership backed by the leading collective of cadres and the Party's institutional structure.

The 9th Conference: Facing an unprecedented challenge

With the Lula government an unprecedented situation arose in Brazil, one quite rare in Latin America. In 2003, the 9th Conference was convened to deliberate on the Party's non-hegemonic participation in the national coalition government. The Conference resolved that the core of the tactic would be to work for the victory of the government in implementing a new development cycle.

In addition to this guideline, the Conference set the orientations for engaging in partisan fronts responsible for running a government. In line with these orientations, the communists started to work for the government to achieve a national development project. Achievement of the national development project is to be measured against the political platform of the front that elected the government, rather than strictly on the basis of the more advanced PCdoB Program. If contradictions arose between the government's political conduct and

the front's program, the communists were to build an outcome closest to the just decision. Should irreconcilable political and programmatic conflicts break out, the Party must decide on the basis of the general interests of its tactic, by adopting positions that may range from a public disavowal to, ultimately, stepping down from the government. As in every multipartisan political front, especially one exercising governmental duties, the prevailing element is unity, as emphasis on "struggle" is bound to disrupt the alliance.

However, the Party rejects *seguidismo* ('tail-endism') and preserves its political independence in relation to the government. Its steadfast support of the government does not entail waiving its political independence. On the contrary, critiquing the government is indispensable for course corrections. The Party defends and respects the autonomy of the social movements. Mobilizing the people is vital for implementing changes. The government, in order to move forward and defend itself against the Brazilian right's atavistic propensity for coup d'états, needs both support and criticism.

Contributions of the PCdoB participation in governments and in parliament

President Lula's successful government and the battle being waged to advance its accomplishments in the Dilma administration have relied on significant contributions by the PCdoB.

The Party's accomplishments in the offices it holds in the government of the Republic, in state and municipal administrations, contribute to the advancement of democracy and conquests of the working class. The Party's engagement is governed by banners and contents furthering sovereign and democratic development, with income distribution and valuing work. The ethical conduct the Party cultivates and requires from those managing public assets is principled on competence, honesty, zeal, and stringency in public matters. Moreover, the Party pledges never to turn its back to the people; rather, the PCdoB governs with the people and respects and fosters the people's struggles and movements.

The communists run the government for the purpose of providing answers to the problems and conundrums of the present, and with a view to improving right now the people's quality of life, strengthening the country's sovereignty, and broadening democracy. Yet each and every accomplishment is constantly guided by the course set –the conquest of socialism.

From 2003 to 2012, in the federal government Party leaders have carried out important duties in a number of the Republic's institutions: at the Ministry of Sports, at the Secretariat of Institutional Relations of the Presidency, at the National Oil Agency (ANP), at the National Cinema Agency (ANCINE), at EMBRATUR (Brazilian Tourism Agency), at the Executive Secretariat of the Minis-

try of Science and Technology, at FINEP (Funding Institute for Studies and Projects), in offices at the Special Secretariat of Policies for the Promotion of Racial Equality (SEPPIR), at the Ministry of Health, at the Ministry of Culture, and at the National Youth Secretariat, among others.

At the Ministry of Sports, the Party furthered the sector by adopting a national policy that developed the sports-related social and economic dimension through incentives laws and public programs and policies. Moreover, the PCdoB played an important role in Brazil's choice to host the 2014 Soccer World Cup and the 2016 Olympics. Here are a few of its accomplishments.

At the Secretariat of Institutional Relations, the PCdoB was instrumental in securing the support of the government's power base in National Congress at a moment of grave political crisis.

At the ANP, the Party played a prominent part in boosting the production of oil, gas, and biofuels, safeguarding the interests of Brazil in this strategic sector. The PCdoB contributed toward the drafting of the regulatory framework for the so called pre-salt, deep-water oil reserves. With oversight, it improved fuel quality. It added professional cadres to the National Oil Agency, thus rendering the agency capable of meeting its mission.

At ANCINE, the Party succeeded in passing Law 11.437/2006 providing for new funding mechanisms and the creation of the Audiovisual Sectoral Fund. It also helped to draft and pass Law

12.485/2011, which laid down the new regulatory framework for subscription television. And at the Ministry of Culture, it implemented programs such as the Cultura Viva grassroots' culture spots.

In the area of science and technology, the Party stepped up research funding programs and overcame institutional hurdles against innovation-driven national development, thus strengthening this critical sector for the national development project.

At the SEPPIR, the communists contributed throughout the entire process of reformulating, negotiating, and passing the Racial Equality Statute. At the National Youth Secretariat and the National Youth Council the PCdoB was a decisive force in promoting youth participation, as well as in implementing the first-ever National Youth Policy, in addition to legal provisions like the Youth Constitutional Amendment Proposal and the Youth Statute, this last one presently being considered in Congress.

The Party's political/electoral strength and its ties with the people's struggles keep growing

The most affirmative tactic, with its three lines for the accumulation of forces, is leading to the Party's strengthening. With rising electoral results, the PCdoB parliamentary representation is respected at every level, especially its delegations in the Chamber of Deputies and in the Federal Senate.

Majoritarian contests have granted the Party visibility, leaders, the spreading of its ideas and, foremost, have disseminated the message that the communists are both willing to and capable of governing.

With regard to the workers' and the people's struggles, the main point is the positive role that the Confederation of Workers of Brazil (CTB) plays in the Brazilian trade union movement, by promoting advanced banners, fostering combativeness and contributing to class unity through the meetings at the Forum of National Trade Union Centers.

Also worth mentioning is the tireless work of the communists to bolster the social movement by defending, whenever possible, unified actions and activities. Accordingly, throughout the various phases of its existence, the Party has supported the Coordination of Social Movements (CMS). Today it participates in a number of movements, encompassing a wide array of themes, causes, and banners: Right to housing, urban reform, antiracist struggle, cultural and environmental movements, for human rights, against homophobia, and so forth.

Moreover, the value and importance the Party ascribes to the struggle for women's emancipation and rights is noteworthy. At the Chamber of Deputies, the PCdoB has the largest proportional women's representation, while also having female party leaders in the states of São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, and Santa Catarina.

A pioneer in defense of emancipatory feminism, the Party holds periodical national conferences on the Woman Question, the instrument by which it updates its policy guiding the struggle of women in society and their role in the party structure. The first conference (2007) approved a quota of at least 30% of women in electoral slates, an affirmative action policy designed to promote gender equity within the Party.

Another rather important trump is the Party's ties with the youth and student movements, whose symbol is the dynamism and representativeness of the Union of Socialist Youth (UJS), founded in 1984, the country's largest political youth organization. Except for some brief periods, since its foundation UJS has been at the head of the National Students' Union and the Brazilian Union of Secondary Students. The UJS became famous by leading important struggles, like the campaign for the right to vote at the age of 16 and the "cara-pintadas" youth movement, the driving force behind the victorious "Collor Out!" mobilizations.

Its originality lies in that it does not follow the traditional model of the communist youth organizations because the UJS is organically independent from the PCdoB structure. This gives it greater reach and flexibility, making it more responsive to the yearnings and lifestyle of the youth. However, the UJS is politically and ideologically connected with the Party and is not, therefore, a non-partisan or front organization.

The UJS has been a school for training cadres, having educated countless presidents of students' and grassroots' movements, parliamentarians and party leaders, in addition to two ministers of State: Aldo Rebelo and Orlando Silva.

12th Congress and most recent accomplishments

The 12th Congress, held in 2009, updated the Party's strategic thought. Building on the framework of the 1995 Program, the 12th Congress moved forward by pointing to the Brazilian path toward socialism: The struggle for a new national development program.

Course and path, that is, socialism and new national development project, intertwined. Each step taken on the path is a step further in the accumulation of forces required for the reforms and ruptures pushing the country forward to a government of transition toward socialism, with workers' hegemony and as an expression of the Nation's yearnings.

Over the ten years that have elapsed since the 10th Congress in 2002, the Party has succeeded in becoming a communist party with a large and wide-spreading militant base. Membership has risen to over 300,000 and the militant structure nearly trebled.

At present, the Party is seeking to intensify its engagement in the ideological struggle by participa-

ting in debates focused on the main contemporary theoretical and political problems and dilemmas.

Fully aware that the big corporate media is the elites' and conservative sectors' favored playing field from which to wage the ideological struggle with the progressive forces, the Party is striving to strengthen its political formation, propaganda, and communication activities, in line with an effort that dates back to 1925, when A Classe Operária was founded. Its tools are constantly upgraded: the National Formation School, the Maurício Grabois Foundation; *Princípios* review and Internet-based news portal Vermelho, are all supported by the party structure. The creation of Vermelho greatly enhanced the Party's communication area, much as the web portal has become a reference for left-wing journalism on the Internet.

The Party's theoretical and ideological work is focused on increasing knowledge of the world reality, of the singularities of contemporary capitalism, and on the new struggle for socialism and an in-depth analysis of the Brazilian reality. These challenges are met in ongoing dialogue with the country's Marxist and progressive thought. The Party's theoretical and ideological work values and seeks to broaden its relations with the advanced intellectuality. Thus, it strives to enrich and develop Marxism. All this effort has resulted in creative and original ideas about how to face the fight for socialism in today's conditions worldwide and in Brazil.

The Party has strengthened its material base and its financial sources. It acquired its national headquarters' building in São Paulo. And, based on its political program and permanently guided by its principles and in compliance with the legislation in force, seeks to increasingly build the material conditions necessary for political action. Still, much remains to be done, as underestimation is still prevalent.

Accordingly, the Party has undertaken a special effort to engage cadres and militants in contributing with the Party's affiliation fees, in keeping with the Party Statute. Such contribution has both a political and ideological dimension, one revealing of an actual bond with the Party and socialist consciousness. Hence, the Party is endeavoring toward the acquisition by a rising number of members of the national militant identity card, so that an ever-increasing membership is registered with the National System for Militant Contribution (SINCOM). Another key feature is the necessary effort to raise electoral campaign funds with the membership, friends, and supporters.



Guidelines for the Party to advance

From the long, 90-year-old history of the Communist Party of Brazil basic conclusions arise that constitute guidelines for the Party to advance in the conquest of its strategic objectives, in its construction, and in its historical mission.

In Unrelenting struggle for the existence of a communist party with revolutionary features and practices – contemporary, strong, independent, and influential – is what ensures victories, both in the most important and decisive clashes of the political and mass-oriented struggle and in upholding long-lasting accomplishments from the perspective of revolutionary change.

The founding and existence of the Marxist-Leninist force, in Brazil's unique conditions, corresponded to the need for social and economic development. This force was born under the influence of the great Socialist Revolution of October and, since the early 1920s, has steadily marked the history of the Communist Party in Brazil. Throughout its uninterrupted nine-decade-long life, the Communist Party's legacy emanating from successive generations of communists has been heroic and prolific. The Party is the hallmark of the advanced, change-seeking political struggle in the history of Brazil, a historical exigency for development by the Brazilian society, and is inte-

rwoven with the country's political history in the 20th century and early 21st century.

Yet, throughout the Brazilian history, the presence has been unstable and fleeting of a strong and big communist party, influential among the workers and the people, the driver of a revolutionary perspective. This situation stemmed from, on the one hand, the aggressive, and often bloodthirsty, anti-Communist action by the conservative and reactionary Brazilian dominant class, an accomplice to the imperialist impositions to which the country has been submitted. Thus, it systematically persecuted the Communist Party, disorganizing its leading collective several times and forcing it into a clandestine or semi-clandestine life throughout most of the Party's history.

On the other hand, for some time Party leaders charted a wavering path, especially until the 1962 reorganization, in their search for a revolutionary line, at times failing to design a just orientation, at other times, opportunistic conceptions prevailing which were expressive of internal splits. This situation evidenced many intervening factors ranging from the growing influence of ideologies foreign to the Party, dominant in the liberal bourgeois society evolving in the country, to insufficient assimilation of the tenets of Marxism, to misunderstandings about the national reality and the historical political direction. Also contributing to the party's core political line inconstancy was the influence of the directives from the Communist International

and the Cominform, which affected the whole of the international communist movement.

The Party's historical instability was further compounded by the revisionist impact caused by the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) of 1956. In that Congress, CPSU First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev (with his Secret Report, which was quickly disseminated by all the Western press) acted as an informant. He denied fundamental principles and dishonored the history and the resulting socialist experience of the Union of the Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR). The report did not focus on extracting lessons from the rights and wrongs in an attempt to develop and enhance the socialist society of the time.

Thus, it brought about true moral and ideological fracture in the structure of the soviet socialist system. This momentous event prompted the appearance of contemporary revisionism, the great historical schism in the communist and workers' world movement, enabling a reactionary and counterrevolutionary turnaround to develop and evolve into its many present-day forms. In the Soviet Union, this situation went on until Mikhail Gorbachev's CPSU leadership. This was the final touch in the transition back from socialism to capitalism in the great land of the soviets.

Throughout the Brazilian experience, the reorganization of the Communist Party of Brazil in 1962 has, since then, been equated to greater theoretical, ideological, and political ripening, reorien-

ting the Party to meet a new situation, with a more consequential direction and steerage. This accumulation in various terrains throughout the 1960s was highly instrumental to orient the Party during the most difficult period of its recent history, that of the 1964-1985 military dictatorship; and also to carry out the major task of facing, on the one hand, the new theoretical and ideological challenges engendered in the aftermath of the collapse of socialism in the USSR and in East Europe and, on the other, the advance and global domination of capitalism in its neoliberal stage.

These great historical challenges urged for answers. The Party resolutely affirmed the communist identity and the option for the revolutionary and socialist alternative, a nodal point of the present times. Such a challenge imposed the development and enrichment of the communists' strategic and tactical thought. The 8th Congress of the PCdoB, in 1992, by focusing on these critical issues, would become a historic milestone for the party's contemporary orientation.

In the course of the history of humanity, socialism is now in its infancy. Today it is possible to state that upholding the Marxist revolutionary option and the renewal and adoption of the socialist alternative compose an integrated binomial of the same system, which can inform and develop today's communist party, a party capable of bringing together broad, advanced political forces and achieve wide influence and prestige with the workers and

the people. In other words, neither withdrawing to a political ghetto, restricted to revolutionary propaganda with no influence on the course of politics and the masses, nor becoming a 'possibilist' and pragmatic group.

This is the core understanding today for the existence of the Communist Party of Brazil: That it proves both capable of defeating imperialism and its domestic reaction and of winning decisive victories in the revolutionary course toward socialism.

2 Theoretical and ideological development and enrichment (based on the most advanced social science, Marxism, and underpinned on social practice) is an essential condition for defining just and consistent policies, as well as a revolutionary program and practice

Marxism-Leninism, a revolutionary theory for the interpretation and application of Marx's thought in the 20th century, is the historical line to which the Communist Party of Brazil belongs. It fell to the genius of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin to develop Marxism in order to respond to the exigencies of the nascent proletarian revolution of the beginning of the last century, consummating the formulation of the revolutionary theory for the new conditions of the time, taking the theory to practice and leading it to victory, in Russia, for the first time in the world. Lenin's thought, based on

Marx, had a universal reach, influencing the victorious revolutionary movement that spread in the last century.

The Russian Revolution deeply marked the 20th century and bequeathed an extraordinary legacy to the workers and humanity. No mistakes and defeats will ever erase this historical evidence: Humanity owes much to the Soviet Union, the center of the anti-imperialist resistance, and to the Soviet Union's solidarity policy toward the peoples and its constant struggle for peace; a policy that, in various points in time, cost dearly for the peoples of that country. In four decades, the Revolution transformed a semi-feudal Russia into a world superpower. The glorious participation of the Red Army in the Second World War was decisive in defeating the powerful armies of Hitler's Germany. The communists are the inheritors of the entire history of this monumental revolutionary undertaking of the last century.

However, the collapse and dismantling of the USSR and the dissolution of the former communist bloc require from the communists the indispensable task of defending socialism and demonstrating that it is feasible and a historical necessity. Thus, it is necessary to develop and update the theory in order to learn from the lessons of that remarkable revolutionary undertaking and to respond to the new phenomena of the present historical period.

According to the Party's understanding as concluded by the 8th Congress (1992), throughout the evolution of the USSR's socialist experience, the

Marxist-Leninist historical tradition neither moved forward nor enriched itself from interpreting the new phenomena emerging from the construction of that experience. What's more, the USSR eventually moved away from the Leninist principles and methods.

The growing demands required to keep developing socialism, particularly in the economic and political realms, were not met by responses aimed at updating and reforming socialism, nor at overcoming its limitations and deformities, that would pave the way for new phases of socialist construction in that country.

Socialism, in its really existing form, can take up several political and economic configurations. The Russian Revolution broke out and the consolidation of the new power of the Soviets unfolded in a historical setting marked by extremely adverse conditions. On the home front such difficulties became salient from the condition of a backward, essentially peasant country that had to face a long period of civil war. At the international level, it had to withstand a protracted imperialist siege and face a world war (in which the USSR was the decisive powerhouse in defeating Nazi-Fascism), an arms race to defend itself, and all sorts of sabotage. All this imposed unanticipated shifts of plans and paths. Lenin, in those days, defined the revolution underway as shrouded in particularities that required abrupt solutions, with crucial dilemmas to be resolved in very little time.

To respond to this unprecedented reality, the USSR was forced, on the one hand, to deepen political centralization, merge party and State structures, and adopt dirigisme in relation to mass organization; on the other, adhere to rigorous economic centralization and ultra-centralized planning, understandable in the context of wars that accompanied the existence of the USSR.

Marxism-Leninism became a State doctrine and stopped developing itself in line with a constantly changing reality. The socialist experience stemming from this process truncated the dialectical and revolutionary nature of the Marxist theory itself, rendering it incapable of facing, reflecting upon, and coming up with solutions for the challenges arising on the path toward the construction of a new society.

Due to the key role played by the Soviet Union and the CPSU, it was inevitable that the prevailing model came to influence and to orient the communist world movement, imposing on the other communist parties a single model of socialism. This imperative indication went counter to the general laws of the social transformation process and dogmatized Marxism, as if it were possible to export or copy revolutions.

This situation evolved and ultimately culminated in the strategic defeat and the demise of the USSR, triggering a crisis of the socialist theory and practice. The 8th Congress of the PCdoB keenly noted that, on the path toward the construction of so-

cialism in the Soviet Union, revolutionary theory had stagnated, thus creating a void and contributing toward the decline of the communist movement. Hence was opened the way for opportunism, routine, bureaucracy, and revisionism, which ultimately led to the counterrevolution.

Since then, communists and revolutionaries have striven to overcome this crisis of theory and practice, driven by the imperative of developing Marxism for the 21st century. In doing so, they are seeking to respond to such imperative by updating the revolutionary theory in light of the advanced social and political practice of the present historical moment. Building on this practice, communists and revolutionaries are engaged in defining a viable alternative – today’s core question. Such alternative must be capable of galvanizing broad social and political forces to defend and apply programs and projects designed to overcome the crisis and the impasses of the capitalist system, resuming the struggle for socialism.

3 Guaranteeing the intrinsic dialectical relation between Party/ leadership formation and winning the working and people’s masses, by acting in the great political events, is critical for the Party to carry out its revolutionary task

In the ninety years of the history of the Communist Party of Brazil, even in the lengthy periods during which the Party was underground,

the PCdoB placed the permanent task of being closely tied to the working and people's masses at the center of its political action and method implementation. This intrinsic relation must be the ultimate expression of the very nature of the Communist Party. The vast majority of the people are the start and finish lines guiding each and every of the Party's undertakings. Withdrawal and isolation of the Party, its leaders, and organizations in relation to the people is a serious symptom of bureaucratism and sectarianism, and a path to degeneracy.

In Lenin's vision, regardless of revolutionary will, the vanguard by itself is incapable of leading the revolution on the path to victory if it fails to win a majority, especially the workers and the people. According to Lenin, Party and workers/people relations should be in the form of a "fusion". Strengthened links with the people can make the Party powerful, as demonstrated by the experience of the revolutionary parties that won and consolidated revolutions.

There should be no disjunction between party and masses, leaders and masses. More precisely, the Party and its leaders are formed in close association with the broad layers of the people engaged in the political events, especially in the decisive moments. The appropriateness and coherence of the Party's politics is attested to and demonstrated in this joint action with the masses along the political course.

In various moments of its history, the PCdoB had strong popular support, while many of its accomplishments were related to mass mobilizations it led, from the most powerful strikes at given junctures to the more radical forms of struggle to the youth and student struggles, which the communists have always strived to lead toward providing responses to the yearnings of the base of the movement. The leading and unrelenting struggle for political unity in the social movements is an essential condition to make them a driving force for broader and deeper transformation. The Party has shown great capacity to attract to its ranks the youth, the students, the workers, those living in city outskirts, and women (who have significantly strengthened significantly the ranks of the transformative struggle). Nonetheless, it is imperative to underscore the Party's persistent problem of restricting mass work, to a large extent, to the movements' leadership, while overlooking bottom-up organizing.

It is on the basis of the synthesis of the relation between the party and the masses that the present stage of the construction of the PCdoB should be viewed. The Party reached the understanding, in its strategic and tactical thought, that the accumulation of forces in the political and practical terrains is the path, in the present conditions, to attain a hegemonic position, indispensable to achieve its revolutionary objectives. Accordingly, as a fundamental part of this accumulation, the precise content of the relationship with the masses is hinged on a higher

exigency: To advance the basic undertaking of winning a majority, especially of workers and the people, for its programmatic project.

Despite the prestige the Party has always enjoyed with certain sectors of the masses, its influence has not become widespread, consistent, and long-lasting. The Party is not majoritarian, or hegemonic, among the workers and the people. This challenge calls for staying the course and developing its orientation. This leap depends, foremost, on the new junctures, events and the breaking out of deeper contradictions. Social processes are complex and not identical, with disparate battle levels and solutions; therefore, there is no ready-made prescription for winning the masses.

Yet, one must bear in mind that the Party and the revolutionary movement's experience indicates that, in order to build a powerful communist party engaged in political mass action, one must distinguish between what is clear, and even a settled matter, for the vanguard from what is actually understood and valued by the working class and the people in general. There is no automatic and simplistic transfer of the vanguard's consciousness to the masses. Thus, it is imperative to know the point of departure for political action, the level of the class struggle battle, in order to bring together the broadest share of masses in the struggle, without relinquishing the policy set.

The simple, yet concrete, precept of further engaging the masses in order to scale up radical

action is efficacious because, without that, the vanguard can isolate itself and lose its capacity to influence and direct. Grandiloquence of revolutionary principles is not enough to convince the masses about the revolutionary alternative. It is in the heat of its practice and under the impact of momentous political events that the workers and the people assimilate the necessity of charting the revolutionary way, being incumbent upon the vanguard to help the people chart their own way and learn from their own experience.

It is worth pointing out that, to come closer and win greater shares of the masses for its project, it does not suffice for the Party to act alone. Capitalism generates the stratification of dominant and dominated classes, with the proliferation of groups and strata distinctly influencing significant swathes of the people. Hence, tactical or long-lasting alliances and agreements may be struck with these sectors that may evolve into a broad front policy, providing the Party with a broader political relation with previously inaccessible strata of the people. This is a necessary way for the workers to realize who the more consequential fighters are and to become aware of the diversity of the “two lines” in practice. This is the task that is incumbent upon the communists when joining a single front, while always aiming at winning the majority of the people, a fundamental condition for them to achieve their ultimate goals.

4 The Party capable of accomplishing its revolutionary mission must be built on firm unity of action that is based on a just policy, tested in the course of the political events. This policy is formulated by deepening the democratic and participatory method, by stimulating creativity and the free expression of individual opinions, by way of the practical mobilizing activity, under the conduction of a single leading center.

Since the struggle against the military regime of 1964, the Communist Party of Brazil has formulated coherent orientations to respond to the demands of the moment. In spite of occasional hurdles and misunderstandings, the PCdoB managed to organize a cohesive collective will capable of theorizing about and applying and disseminating the policy adopted. A major accomplishment occurred in the 1990s, when the whole Party faced and sought to respond in unity to the deep crisis stemming from the downfall of socialism in the USSR and the major neoliberal offensive against the progressive ideals.

At present, the PCdoB shows the same cohesion in face of the new challenges posed by, and the responsibilities assumed with, the political cycle that started in 2002, when it was necessary to define a new political orientation with regard to the Party's position and participation in the government elec-

ted with the support of the communists. Cohesion that was reaffirmed in the programmatic reformulation, having as background the new struggle for socialism and the drafting of the new Statute and the new cadre policy.

The building of Party unity is carried out with democratic centralism as the Party's organization guiding principle, attuned with experience and the present time. Thus, the Party demonstrates that just ideas are the outcome of broad participation and the militants' and cadres' free expression.

The new Statute of the PCdoB is the result of its broad experience, especially from the longest uninterrupted period of legality it enjoys today. Moreover, the new Statute also represents an effort to defend the communist identity and renew conceptions and practices to better meet the conditions for implementing the Socialist Program and Party policies, in consonance with the new demands. The new PCdoB Statute is a synthesis of the Party's institutionality, which lays down principles and procedures designed to build and safeguard the Party's unity with the highest organizational level.

The work of the national leading collective has entered a new phase, shaking up the old methods that curtail the voicing and coming up with new ideas. The Party is seeking to broaden the democratic participation of its militant collective in responding to the political demands of each given situation and in building the Party's programmatic thought. The National Political Commission has

taken over its role as the general leading body and the gravitational center for the building of the Party's orientation, for ultimate approval by the Central Committee.

The unity-driven construction process of the leading bodies was enhanced and entrenched in a statutory norm. It comprises a conscious and focused process of multilateral consultations, with open debates in plenary sessions and within the Party, ensuring straightforwardness and frankness.

Especially after the 12th Congress, the whole Party was urged to reassess Party functions and rotate, leading to a renewal of the cadre structure's roles, functions, and contours. Hence emphasis is placed on building the Party's theoretical and ideological capabilities, based on Marxism, the defense of the revolution, and on the Party's Socialist Program. The expected result is increased support of the Party's political project.

Since the 11th Congress, the secret ballot has been adopted for the final voting to elect members of the leading collectives and delegates to Party events. The secret ballot is the final phase of a broad process of open debates and diverse consultations. Militants vote with their own consciences, democratically, free from objective and subjective constraints, undoubtedly an enhancement to the Party's internal electoral system.

In its longest period in legality, the Communist Party of Brazil has undertaken an ideological fight against tendencies opposing its revolutionary

conception. This combat requires clarity of course, permanent assessment, and control. In prolonged periods of accumulation of forces, with no major class conflicts, with the indispensable broadening of party ranks, and participation on various political and social fronts, the Party is subject to the ideological pressures prevailing in society, which might lead to deviances and concessions, eventually undermining Party unity. These foreign tendencies manifest themselves in the struggle of ideas, in politics, and in the analytical and working methods. Important steps have been taken since the 8th Congress of the PCdoB against the dogmatic tendencies of a scholastic conception that have been rooted in society since Brazil's early days, tendencies which still have influence among the militant collective and might, eventually, hinder thought emancipation.

In the three last Party Congresses, spanning over the more recent political context, attention has been focused on tendencies that, for their very nature, must be confronted: Liberalism, pragmatism, and corporatism. They represent, in different ways, hurdles ultimately bringing about a depreciation of the strategic sense of the struggle and of the Party's role itself; a relaxation of the Party's commitments; pressure for autonomy by interest groups inside the Party; a downgrading of political fight in the militants' practice; and to 'spontaneism' in organizing both the militants and the masses.

The long history of the Party has demonstrated that a just policy promotes unity, is drafted with

the broadest participation of cadres and militants, and requires a relation based on dialogue and debate with society's advanced thought.

5 Those who build and gather the means and conditions to set up and organize the Party are its cadres. Once the political line has been defined, they become the decisive factor in applying the decisions taken.

The Communist Party of Brazil, due to its having lived long periods in hiding, had statutes and a cadre policy, whether explicitly or not, that were shaped to respond to those exceptional days. It structured itself, in practice, as a party of cadres, hardening them in the harsh periods of class struggle. The strength and the prestige of the PCdoB owe much to these generations of outstanding party leaders. Since its reorganization in 1962, and even after the conquest of legality in 1985, no Statute had been drafted in Congress. This would happen at the 11th Congress in 2005. Shortly afterwards, at the 12th Conference of 2009, a new breakthrough was accomplished with the approval of the updated cadre policy, which put forth and has been setting in place a cadre structure for the present days, for a concrete mission.

Today, the conception present in the programmatic and political line of the PCdoB is hinged on the understanding that it is time for a new

struggle for socialism. This conclusion calls for a principled Communist Party, a mass party shaped by the modern mass, oriented toward political action, strengthened in its organic life to the scale of hundreds of thousands of members. A Party with resolute leading collectives filled with revolutionary conviction, a Party steadily qualifying itself as the decisive force of the revolution and of the building of socialism. Thus, in addition to such attributes, the PCdoB is engaged in preparing broad swathes of workers and people in political activism. The broader the militant ranks, the more cadres become necessary.

As there is no single model of party organization, there is no single cadre model either. The cadre policy is an integral part of the Party's organizational models and options, which always have political roots. The organization is always at the service of a policy.

The updated cadre policy has prompted the Party to provide new responses to the question of the formation and role of myriad types of leadership, such work being the essence of party building and organization. A new cadre framework is already being implemented whose consolidation will be attained as the militancy assimilates and applies the new orientation.

The Party is going to great lengths to carry out its strategic project. In a way both planned and persistent, the Party is pushing forward the formation of cadres at the national level and is stepping up

the development of a host of mid-level and rank-and-file leaders. The PCdoB is responsive to the formative needs of prominent militants acting in the world of work and of those more specifically engaged in the ideological struggle, in the world of culture and science. It further extends this capacity building to those performing technical advisory work to the Party, Party lawmakers and government bodies. The PCdoB has also succeeded in forming and educating many outstanding youth and women leaders, thus gaining a reputation for a youth and women party.

Today the cadre policy is guided by the renewal of roles and functions, fostering rotation as a means to regulating the life of the Party. It advances theoretical and ideological education and training based on Marxism and on the defense of the revolution, and on the Socialist Program of the PCdoB. It seeks to train cadres based on the principles of qualification, specialization, and representation. The recent opening of the National Department for Cadres of the National Organizing Department started a new phase in terms of steerage and systematic specialization of the Party's cadre structure, as it evolves within this new conception.

The National Education and Training Commission, through the Party's National School and the Maurício Grabois Foundation, has risen to a new level in militant training and Party propaganda. The Foundation has contributed to elevate the ideological struggle, with a sweeping agenda of events

bringing together champions of the PCdoB and allied parties, professors and specialists to debate controversial and advanced themes. The National School has reached a phase where it trains thousands of cadres and militants, catering to the rank-and-file and the middle leadership. Today, it has succeeded in setting up permanent teaching and research centers, opening up sections of the School in several states, and designing contents for a four-level curriculum. As part of the basic curriculum, the School prepared (while revealing great creative effort) a new version of the Course on the Socialist Program (CPS), supported by audiovisual materials and coaches, for mass expansion across the militant base. Moreover, the National Department for Cadres has produced a collection entitled PCdoB Strategic Studies, to support cadres studying across the nation, especially the members of the Central Committee.

IV

New times, new struggle for socialism

The Communist Party of Brazil is indispensable for the new times and the new struggle for socialism. Equipped with strategic and revolutionary thought and a combative, comprehensive, and flexible tactic, the Party leverages its own experience and boldly sets out to systematize the challenges of the Brazilian revolution.

Today we are going through a new historical period that poses new challenges and requires present-day answers and alternatives. It is imperative for the PCdoB to reinforce convictions in order to rekindle fundamental principles reaffirming of the communist cause and identity. At the same time, to engage in a great creative endeavor in order to renew the party's basic line, the result of theoretical and practical accumulation. This undertaking cannot stop; it must be continued and developed.

Evolution and development of the programmatic thought, both strategic and tactical

Drawing on the 1962 revolutionary reorganization, on the profuse and harsh experience concentrated over two decades of combats against the military dictatorship, and on a greater command of the national reality, underpinned on Marxism-Leninism, the Party began to solidify and perfect its revolutionary politics and ideology. After the 1964 military coup, the PCdoB started to chart a

well-defined and steady course, distinguishing more clearly the strength of the leading collective, its allies, and the main enemy of the revolution in Brazil.

The evolution of the Party's programmatic tactical and strategic thought reflected, as an essential indicator, its infancy and maturity phases, of affirmation of or deviation from its nature, of the struggle for revolutionary reorganization when it strayed away from its original principles and higher objectives.

The Communist Party of Brazil, since its founding in 1922, had been oriented by the Program of the Communist International. For a long time the PCdoB acted without an own program. Party goals were not very well defined, thus militants had no clarity of the course and path to take. The August Manifesto of 1950 started to lay down some strategic conclusions and to point to the revolutionary path, yet it viewed reality in a narrower, more sectarian way. The first Party Program appeared at the 4th Congress, held in 1954. Despite its limitations and shortcomings, this Program was the first great step to systematize programmatic conclusions, since it oriented toward the revolutionary path and already demonstrated a certain command of the Brazilian reality.

Yet soon the 1954 Program would be rejected and replaced with the March Declaration of 1958, which was expressive of the reformist vision that proclaimed a leading and consequential role for the

national bourgeoisie in the revolutionary process and, on the foreign front, of the strong influence of the revisionist outbreak denying fundamental principles. It was then that began to deepen the most important ideological and theoretical struggle of the Brazilian communist and labor movement. The line of the Declaration of 1958 was approved in full in 1960 at the 5th Party Congress under fierce debate. The Marxist revolutionary core that gradually built up in opposition to the reformist and revisionist positions reached the tipping point: To reorganize the Party and uphold its principles and revolutionary identity.

Qualitative shift in the 1962 Program and advance of the basic line against the military dictatorship

The National Conference of February 1962, which reorganized the Communist Party of Brazil, approved a new Program that was absolutely distinct from the line of the 1958 Declaration. It stated that only the revolutionary struggle would give the power to the working class and its key allies. This Program focused on key national issues and on the experience of the Brazilian working class and people. In addition, it indicated that the hardships for advancing socially and politically could be traced to three fundamental class-related elements: 1- imperialism, particularly United States imperialism; 2- latifundia; and 3- national monopolistic groups

in association with foreign capital.

The 1962 Program represented a qualitative leap in the Party's theoretical and political knowledge, despite its failure then to correlate strategy and a path to be followed.

Thereafter, exhibiting greater ideological and political maturity, and without losing sight of the course, the Party managed to shape and evolve its strategy and tactic in a more self-assured and dialectical way. After 1964, with the military junta in power, the PCdoB would become a more consequential political force, one capable of building a feasible path and goals, which would consolidate the role of the communist banner with the end of the dictatorship.

In its evolution, the Party's strategy was never fixed, driven by 'principle-ism', but consistent with the great events that were unfolding. The tactic, linked to the strategy, was broad and flexible enough to vary according to the correlation of forces and the circumstances. Responding to the new events triggered by the 1964 coup, the Party – by updating its strategy and tactic – proposed at the 6th Conference in 1966 the following text, "Union of the Brazilians to rid the country from the crisis, the dictatorship, and the neocolonialist threat". It was a far-reaching political call, one that sought to bring together key sectors of the dominant classes who were not aligned with the U.S. imperialism, the mastermind behind the coup, and with the dictatorship's growing violence. The armed resistance in

the Araguaia, as the Party's response to the regime's 'fascisticizing', was underpinned on platforms that advocated for the just and pressing yearnings of the people in the hinterland, in the context of the broad political perspective of overcoming the dictatorship.

During the decline of the military regime, the PCdoB, as a key pro-democracy and liberty force oriented by its ultimate goals, formulated the period's three historical banners: struggle for the revocation of exceptional laws; for broad, general, and unrestricted amnesty; and a call for a freely-elected Constituent Assembly. The Party had a prominent participation in the massive Direct Elections Now! struggle, later defeated in Congress.

Hence, in a decisive action, just as the dictatorship waned, the Party played a prominent role, revealing of keen strategic and tactical reasoning, by initiative of its president, João Amazonas. Amazonas contributed to persuade Tancredo Neves, the then governor of the state of Minas Gerais and representing a key sector in the dominant class that opposed the dictatorship, to (with the support of a broad front and the PCdoB) defeat the dictatorship in the very Electoral College set up by the generals. Tancredo Neves eventually resigned to the governorship of his state and won in the Electoral College. With his untimely death, his vice-president, José Sarney, was sworn in. The road to the ensuing democratization process had been opened, with a prominent and increasing political role of the PCdoB in the 1988 Constituent Assembly and,

later on, in formulating and leading the Popular Brazil Front (1989), which launched Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva on his persistent road, with the Party's key and constant participation until his victory in 2002. The course of the evolution of the Party's basic political line tells more than skillful tactical movements. Its essence lies in the fact that, whenever the Party proved to be able to interpret the uniqueness of class struggle in Brazil, without copying imported models, the Party was able to dare and, in given opportunities, to thrill the people.

1995 Program – The new vision of the revolutionary strategic thought

Another remarkable new phase in the evolution of the programmatic thought of the PCdoB started developing as from the late 1980s with the fall of the eastern European governments and the end of the Soviet Union. On the wake of these events a counterrevolutionary and anti-Communist wave placed the communists before the immense challenge of resisting, conducting critical analysis and self-criticism, and renewing. Under the guidance of João Amazonas, the Party sought to face and defeat the reactionary onslaught by standing for the communist identity and developing a new vision to guide the Party on the road back to the revolution. The core understanding achieved was that the theoretical stagnation that took place during the socialist experience in the Soviet Union and the

dogmatism and schematism prevailing inside the communist parties prompted the doctrine to become fixed, without a stirring up that allowed an advance befitting the new challenges of that time.

The Party was impelled to review its revolutionary strategy and conceive a new Program. It was shackled to unresolved contradictions, mimicking experiences foreign to the national reality. In accordance with the line of the preceding programs, the revolution in Brazil had two phases – one, national democratic; the other, socialist. To attempt to explain this contradiction, at the 7th Congress (1988) the Party even came to state that the two revolutionary phases had already become “intertwined”.

At the 8th Congress, held in 1992, the original elementary conclusion was made accurate: Objectively, the revolutionary path in Brazil was already one of struggle for socialism. This conclusion stemmed from analyses holding that the political power had been under the hegemony of the bourgeoisie for a long time; that this class had failed to meet the conditions to successfully lead national independence and democratic and social advance; that Brazil’s dependent, mid-development capitalism (a situation further accentuated with the neoliberal globalization) required stricter compliance with democracy- and national sovereignty-related tasks.

Such tasks, as underscored by the 8th Congress, can be undertaken within the framework of the socialist revolution itself. The latter begins with the conquest of political power by the working class

and its key allies derived from the advance of their political and social consciousness. Thus begins the preliminary transition to socialism, through phases and stages toward a new power and economy. Consolidating national independence and achieving full democratic and social progress would only be possible through the transition toward socialism. The road to this transition, with the necessary accumulation of forces, shall be one of increased struggling against the conservative forces, since advancing requires shifts and disruptions. And, lastly, this Congress reaffirmed that there was no single universal revolution and socialism-building template.

The Program approved at the 1995 National Conference, following from the decisions of the 8th Congress, was designed within this framework and encompasses the modern phase of the PCdoB's revolutionary programmatic thought. This structure laid the cornerstones for the necessary updating that culminated in the new Socialist Program approved at the 12th Congress, in 2009, from which emanates the development of the current tactic and the convergent political action of every Party sphere.

New Socialist Program of 2009 – revolutionary, present-day, tangible, and accessible

The revolutionary movement is still living under the impact of its strategic defeat and the profound

shift in the correlation of forces that favored capitalism-imperialism. However, the most critical phase of the early 1990s has steadily evolved into the dawn of a new historical period, making it possible to envisage how to renew the socialist alternative and open up the possibility of greater accumulation in the revolutionary sense.

Today, in the eyes of the PCdoB, this new historical age is marked, predominantly, by the great structural crisis of capitalism, begun in 2007-2008, in a world where the power system is gradually changing; by the opening up of a new political cycle in the history of Brazil in 2002, with Lula's presidential victory; and by the new political situation experienced by the Latin-American continent for more than one decade, with the ascent of the democratic and anti-imperialist movement. All this takes place in a historical era that accumulated a gigantic and unprecedented modern material base, manifesting simultaneous trends, a time boundary and the threshold of a new age that may dawn. The dominant capitalist relations of production and distribution have become increasingly more powerless in releasing this vast material and immaterial force for the benefit of humanity as a whole.

This unprecedented present-day historical period has brought the peoples and the nations to a crossroads. The course that will prevail from this historical junction toward a new era is related to the outcome of the ideological and political struggle, whose key goal is to target and fight for a ne-

cessary and feasible new alternative. Stemming from this circumstance, either new forms of political action arise that are capable of fostering and shaping the organization of social and political forces that may come to be the driving force of revolutionary transformation, or the current capitalist system and order will prevail for a long historical period, conditioning other and deeper crises, causing stagnation and historical backwardness.

The 1995 Program, framed in the modern phase of the Party's programmatic thought, had to be updated to account for this new and unprecedented historical situation in order to be applicable as a strategic and tactical project to today's concrete conditions. Signs thereof had already been detected as early as 2005. Therefore, for more than three years a sweeping debate took place in the Party, and outside, in a number of seminars hosted by the Maurício Grabois Foundation, under the auspices of the Party's National School and other partisan and academic institutions, and through countless articles and essays published in review *Princípios*. This process was crowned by the 12th Congress, in which the unanimously approved new Program was to be the key discussion document.

The 2009 Program is the result of a great effort by the Party to respond to the key question posed by today's historical juncture: The alternative to be followed, the new struggle for socialism, in the Brazilian conditions. Hence, the current 2009 Program has found its place in the Brazilian political

history both by signaling to a potentially advanced tomorrow and by underscoring that the advance of the Brazilian nation in the current historical era calls for a “third great civilization leap”.

In the evolution of the Brazilian revolution dynamics, the transition toward socialism is destined to be this “leap”, the course the Program points to and orients toward its accomplishment. In order to achieve this course, the necessary path is made concrete by implementing the New National Development Project (NPND). The reforms it proposes, the banners it raises, and the prospects it points to are all driven by a spirit and the contents of an anti-imperialist, antilatifundium, and antifinancial oligarchy nature.

Therefore, this Project outlines the road, yet going beyond general concepts and guidelines, thus closing a gap left by the previous Program. This Project places this road in the recent political history of Brazil and proposes a solution to “the crisis of projects” the country is going through, deepened since the 1980s. The draft project is a proposal to the workers, allies, and the people in general for the purpose of actually contributing to overcome the Brazilian deadlocks of the present days.

Current Program mirrors recent events in Brazil and worldwide

The drafting of the current Program has already incorporated, therefore, in the new historical mo-

ment, the most recent developments, namely the deepening of the global crisis of capitalism and, in Brazil, the accomplishments made by the second Lula administration.

With the 9th National Conference (June 2003) and in light of Lula's win in the presidential race, a new orientation was set forth that had important implications for strategy and tactic. The PCdoB decided to join the new government by taking into account the new historical juncture outlined in the early 21st century, the correlation of forces of global, neoliberal and capitalist dominance and, foremost, the key role played by the PCdoB throughout the political path that led to the victory of Lula's candidacy in 2002.

This entirely new situation in which the Communist Party, though not being hegemonic, became a member of a national coalition government, prompted it to define a new general tactic, considering the duality and limits of the Lula government and the character of the government's established coalition.

Thereof stemmed the decision to encourage the new government to set in place a national project designed to overcome the neoliberal status quo, as a transition for the country's sovereign, democratic, and social advance, a task that would fall to the PCdoB and the leftist forces; while simultaneously defending the government from the destabilizing action of the conservative and reactionary opposition.

The present Program systematizes and develops the tactic's core idea, followed by the party since 2003, enunciated in the context of the vision of what a New National Development Project on the course to socialism should be, in conditions typical of Brazil. This is the basis upon which the PCdoB has proposed a development project to the coalition government configured in the Lula administrations. A project that comes close to what the Party advocates.

The outcomes of the structural crisis of capitalism (whose solution is still far in the horizon) bring about strong instability and uncertainty across the world. This is a crisis marked by the hypertrophy of the financial system, at the highest international scale. "Interest-bearing" capital takes center stage in economic, social, and political relations. The crisis is revealing of how the capitalist State is entirely at the service of the financial oligarchy. As demonstration of this huge political power, never before in the history of capitalism had a State response been so swift and abundant in bailouts to rescue from bankruptcy the big banks and the financial institutions.

Moreover, the dimension of the crisis shows that neoliberalism has utterly failed. Nonetheless, it is still alive, solidifying its power structure, striving to acquire the capabilities to impose draconian solutions, saving the interests of rentier, parasitic capital. This kind of "solution" only compounds the crisis and brings about wide so-

cial degradation, besides catalyzing the regression of the political environment, with the strengthening of the far-right. These reactionary forces seek to impart discouragement and inertia among the working masses. However, it is in this world context of widespread and somber social crisis that the anti-imperialist and anticapitalist struggle can thrive. The peoples are compelled to resist, as has increasingly been succeeding, and will rise again in new forms of struggle and organization. Sooner or later, a disruption of the dominant system may arise that will pave the way to the threshold of a new civilizing age.

This circumstance renders it clear that the political-economic system of the dominant classes, at the present stage of capitalism, is spearheaded by the big financial monopolies, a ruling oligarchy with global power, the bulwark of imperialism. This circumstance also corroborates the Socialist Program when it states that, in the Brazilian case, “the pro-imperialist political and social sectors and the great beneficiaries of its rentier/speculative network” are the main enemies to be defeated in order to push forward the New National Development Project. In this context of “modern” stratification of the bourgeoisie it is possible to set up a broad political and social front (led by the more consequential political forces) that may come to express the true interests of the workers, bring together those sectors committed to the production, and encompass broad segments of the Nation.

In an attempt to keep up with the new issues yielded by social struggle in Brazil and worldwide, the PCdoB incorporated the defense of the environment as another banner for the new struggle for socialism, a further addition to the ongoing struggles for gender equality, racial equality, and against all kinds of discrimination.

Distinguishing a new historical opportunity and charting its own road

The enforcement of the law of “capitalism’s combined and unequal development” has been causing the steady and relative decline of the biggest hegemonic imperialist power, the United States. In contrast, the dialectic of this objective law produces the rise of new dynamic centers in the form of emerging powers that may transform the global crisis into an opportunity for their greater relative growth. At the head of this march toward transition is the People’s Republic of China. The U.S. imperialism responds to its own decline with more aggressive action, while mobilizing its loyal allies to, together, devise and open up new war fronts in strategic areas. Moreover, it concentrates military bases in highly-sensitive parts of the planet and deploys naval fleets, shrouding the present world in greater uncertainty.

Still, new alternatives to the systemic crisis of capitalism may flourish. The countries that have upheld the socialist perspective (China, Vietnam,

and Cuba, among others) seek their own solutions to guarantee the continuity of the socialist path, adopting different forms of production to strengthen the productive forces, under the power of the people's democracy that arose from the revolution. Thus these countries create new expressions for contemporary socialism.

In Brazil, the Lula government, continued by the Dilma Rousseff government, paved the way for significant shifts. The Lula government led Brazil to a prominent role in a world in transition and began to generate social mobility, by increasing the income of the poorest. In Latin America experiences are thriving of a democratic, patriotic, and popular nature, a setting in which Brazil plays a key role. Today, the integration led by the Latin-Americans themselves can actually move forward, without the meddling of the United States and Europe. The strengthening of the UNASUL (Union of South American Nations) and the creation of the CELAC (Community of South-American and Caribbean States) are the crowning of a new historical process that, while including Cuba, excluded the imperialist tutelage and presence that plagued the continent.

The new historical period in the framework of the characteristics described calls on the communists and the progressive forces, as set forth in the Party Program, "to distinguish new opportunities and find [their] own roads", roads which should "not be limited to remedying the impasse generated by the great crisis of capitalism". In the vision

of the current Program, the victory of the New National Development Project depends on the extent to which national sovereignty and democratic and social advance are consolidated. However, the country's true independence and affirmation, and full democratic and social advance, will only be possible with the opening up of the road to socialism. Socialism, in turn, cannot triumph without embracing the cause of sovereignty and national affirmation. Only with national liberation will social liberation be possible.

The national question becomes central because, in the imperialist stage, it is incumbent upon the countries of the so-called periphery of the system, relegated to dependency in the international division of labor, above all, to safeguard national independence. This is a struggle of a strategic magnitude, one involving the whole of the Latin American continent. It manifests itself in the disjunction 'people's yearnings for deeper development and social progress' versus 'the powerful interests of domination of imperialism and its domestic allies'.

The struggle for sovereignty is defined in a national project in which the democratic and social struggle has already acquired a bigger dimension, as in the situation of Brazil. Another condition favoring the affirmation of sovereignty is the country's mid-development stage of capitalism, with a diversified, medium-sized industrial park, plus hosts of workers and middle social layers.

The Socialist Program of the PCdoB states that the democratic question is the result of the level of consciousness of the working class and the people in general, of the enhancement of the country's political institutions, and of political freedom. There is an intertwining of the democratic and social question. Democracy strengthens itself when the popular masses achieve social rights and improve their standard of living, as is presently taking place in Brazil. And particularly when a stage of sharp reduction of inequality is reached. This is the democracy that bothers the dominant classes.

The New National Development Project described in the current Program is the Brazilian road to socialism and, therefore, is not an end in itself. The Project's cornerstones include the struggle for sovereignty and the defense of the Nation, the democratization of society, social progress through structural reforms, the defense of the environment, and the 'solidary' integration of Latin America.

The conquest of hegemony by the consequential forces, supported by a broad social base, focused on the transition toward socialism, is the realization and accomplishment of the New National Development Project. From a programmatic view, this is the concrete political path to accumulate forces, to raise the workers' and the Nation's majority's political and organizing role, and to reach the broadest political freedom. Thus will the Communist Party of Brazil and the progressive forces gather the conditions to grow and strengthen themselves as sub-

jects driving a process that may, at the height of the battle, lead to a people's democratic government that genuinely represents the Brazilian Nation.

The conquest of hegemony, in the PCdoB's own understanding, now considering the Party's key functions on the political course to materialize the New National Development Program, consists in permanently relating and integrating action in the institutional realm with political intervention in the mass movement and active participation in the ideological struggle. The Party's basic political line provides orientation on all these tasks. These foundations guide its practical action and prepare the Party to take up a leading role in the political struggle's growing march.

In keeping with the line calling for accumulation of forces, the PCdoB has expanded and strengthened itself on every front, especially after the second Lula government. In the electoral field, its participation is qualitatively altered with the launch of multiple majoritarian candidacies, broadening and strengthening its electoral clout. As a result of its rising accumulation of forces, the Party, by expressing its revolutionary identity and becoming more influential and structured, produces great concern in the conservative dominant forces.

Evidence of such concern is the reactionary fury that targeted the PCdoB. In the second semester of 2011 a prolonged campaign against the Party was unleashed, orchestrated by a front led by the big conservative monopolistic media, which ultimately

sought (and is still seeking) to destabilize the Dilma Rousseff administration.

This battle provided the opportunity for demonstrating some eloquent evidence, more significant of the present PCdoB: A united militant collective reacted with pride and dignity in face of the recent ignominious attack and received broad solidarity from friends and allies representing the most diverse sectors of society, in defense of the Party and in support of former Minister Orlando Silva.

A patriotic and internationalist Party

Since its founding, the Communist Party of Brazil has accumulated a wealth of experience in internationalist friendship, solidarity, exchange, and cooperation. From 1992 on, a moment of cathartic anti-Communism, when the PCdoB held its 8th Congress, the Party's internationalist activity entered a new phase, increasingly acquiring theoretical and political density and establishing broad and varied relations with communist, revolutionary, progressive, and anti-imperialist political forces.

The internationalist action of the PCdoB today is respected all over the world, and is conducted by Party leaders, parliamentarians and government officials, cadres, and militants from the labor, students', women's, and grassroots' movements, communists dedicated to the ideological struggle; in other words, by the entire party collective.

In the struggle for peace and against imperialist war, throughout these 90 years the communists have occupied streets and squares. The Party's and the country's history is ripe with actions ranging from the great campaigns against Nazi-Fascism and imperialism to the battles of the 1990s, by helping organize demonstrations denouncing the first aggression against Iraq in 1991 and against Yugoslavia in 1999, to the present days in the mobilizations opposing the second aggression against Iraq in 2003 and the aggressions against Afghanistan and, more recently, against Libya.

To boost the pacifist movement in the country and confer the deserved importance upon the flag of peace, in 2004 the PCdoB helped to create the Brazilian Center for Solidarity with the Peoples and the Struggle for Peace (CEBRAPAZ).

Throughout their history, the communists have stood out by striving to raise the consciousness of and rally the workers and the Brazilian people in international solidarity actions. For example, in solidarity with countries like Cuba, Venezuela, Syria, Iran, and the People's Korea, nations that, in searching for their own and independent road to development, are permanently vilified by the U.S. imperialism. The communists have also condemned the countless abuses perpetrated by Israel in the Middle East and, since the 1940s, have stood up for the cause of the Palestinian State.

The PCdoB promotes and fosters anti-imperialist, internationalist mass action. The Brazilian

communists help to push forward international mass entities such as, among others, the World Federation of Trade Unions, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the Students Latin-American Hemispheric Organization, the Women's International Democratic Federation, and the Our America Trade Union Meeting.

More recently, in the struggle against the hegemony of the neoliberal policies, the PCdoB had an active participation in the World Social Forum, which began in January 2001 in the city of Porto Alegre, in the Assemblies of Social Movements, and in the Summits of the Peoples.

The PCdoB today has broad relations with over 180 communist, revolutionary, progressive, and anti-imperialist parties from more than 100 countries from every continent. The Party participates in the International Meetings of Communist and Workers Parties, and hosted, in 2008, the 10th International Summit of Communist and Workers Parties, the first time the event took place outside a Euro-Asian country.

The PCdoB also participates in the São Paulo Forum, the most important meeting space of the Latin-American and Caribbean left, and is present in important events, seminars, and congresses organized bilaterally or multilaterally by friendly political forces.

The challenge of the present is to further develop this internationalist activity in theoretical, political, and practical terms, in line with the new

Socialist Program of the PCdoB and the new role played by Brazil in the world.

The Communist Party of Brazil has been forged and built in battles demanding the most from the communists, as its nine-decade-long history shows. It has amassed a wealth of experience in its long history, stayed the course, upheld its identity, and managed to formulate a coherent basic line after a varied learning process.

The Party's historical accumulation and political background qualify it to face the greatest battles and the biggest challenges that will inevitably arise for the accomplishment of a respected and democratic Nation, at the same time sovereign and driven by solidarity. Only the accomplishment of socialism, in Brazilian conditions, will ensure the fulfillment of the just aspirations of the Brazilian people.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Brazil

São Paulo, 1 April 2012.

Cover photos



Maurício Moraes



[1] PCdoB founders in 1922;

[2] João Amazonas in Brasília, 1985, walking up the presidential *Palácio do Planalto* ramp to receive the news that the PCdoB was no longer banned;

[3] Astrojildo Pereira;

[4] Luiz Carlos Prestes;

[5] Communist delegation at the 1946 Constituent Assembly;

[6] Renato Rabelo and the Central Committee elected by the 12th Congress, 2009;

[7] Workers and communist militants with Party flags on the May Day celebrations on Paulista Avenue, São Paulo, 2005.

Obs.1: Except for photo [6], by Maurício Moraes, we were unable to trace the authors of the remaining photos. We will be pleased to acknowledge their credits should their authors contact us.

Obs. 2: On this book's cover photograph [7] had filter effects applied.

In 90 years of action spanning the 122 years of the existence of the Federative Republic of Brazil, the communists – their ideals, struggles, and accomplishments – have helped to shape Brazil.

The legacy of the Communist Party of Brazil to the Nation and the workers dates back to its founders, symbolically represented by the talent of Astrojildo Pereira; proceeds in the tumultuous and enriching years of the mid-20th century, when the name of popular leader Luiz Carlos Prestes most prominently stands out, and culminates in the present days with the critical role played by João Amazonas as builder and ideologue of the Communist Party, a party that flourished and expanded in the last 40 years of the 20th century.

Today, under the direction of Renato Rabelo the Party continues to grow just as it keeps building up its capacity to meet the challenges posed by the new struggle for socialism arising from the paradoxes of contemporary capitalism and the advance of the transformative movement.

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